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I. INTRODUCTION
[V~irtually anything the Court deems politically undesirable can be turned
into political corruption-by simply describing its effects as politically 'corro-
sive, 'which is close enough to 'corruptive' to qualify. It is sad to think that the
First Amendment will ultimately be brought down not by brute force but by
poetic metaphor1
Corporations cannot speak, but they can spend and thereby have a
voice. Here lies the crux of a first amendment problem: To what ex-
tent can or should the government regulate the ability of corporations
to spend for the purpose of influencing public policy? On one hand,
those seeking to prohibit corporate political spending fear corporate
dominance of the political process. 2 By virtue of their economic
strength, corporations are seen as privileged "deep pockets" that cor-
rupt our political system by drowning out individuals and other groups
in society.
On the other hand, corporate strategists consider active political
involvement to be indispensable in protecting business interests
against ever-increasing and potentially unwise government regula-
1. Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 110 S. Ct. 1391, 1411 (1990)(Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
2. See generally C. LINDBLOOM, POLITICS AND MARKETS (1977)(corporations have a
privileged and disproportionately powerful role in government).
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tion.3 Our form of government assumes that wise policy is possible
only if those who understand the policy are allowed to address it in
public discourse. By attempting to correct unwise public policies, cor-
porations speak beyond their own narrow self-interest. According to
this view, corporations are no different from any other group in soci-
ety with legitimate political concerns and responsibilities-corpora-
tions have a right to be heard.4
This Article studies the legal status of corporate political speech in
the referendum/initiative process and questions whether the current
ability of corporations to participate in that process should be
abridged. Although proponents of campaign finance reform5 question
the legitimacy of corporate participation in both candidate elections
and ballot proposition campaigns, this Article will focus only on the
latter issue.6
Despite many state legislative attempts to limit or prohibit corpo-
rate participation in ballot proposition campaigns, the U.S. Supreme
Court in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti 7 appeared to recog-
nize a corporate right to participate in the referendum process based
on the first amendment. Although a few commentators agree with
the Court's reasoning in Bellotti,8 most have strongly criticized the de-
cision. Both sides of the argument raise valid points. While a number
of studies have shown that corporate spending can have a dispropor-
tionate impact on the ballot issue process,9 corporate input and exper-
tise may be needed to resolve many of the social and economic
problems currently on the political agenda.10
Can we somehow protect the ability of individuals, corporations,
and other groups to engage in political discussion concerning ballot
issues and, at the same time, lessen the chances of any element over-
powering another? The search for a compromise has taken on increas-
ing significance because corporate political speech is currently in great
3. Buchholz, Adjusting Corporations to the Realities of Public Interests and Policy,
in STRATEGIC ISSUES MANAGEMENT, 50, 51 (R. Heath ed. 1988).
4. See, e.g., Vogel, The New Political Science of Corporate Power, 87 PUB. INTEREST
63, 78 (1987).
5. See, eg., Cox, Forward.- Freedom of Expression in the Burger Court, 94 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 70 (1980); Wright, Money and the Pollution of Politics: Is the First
Amendment an Obstacle to Political Equality?, 82 CoLUM. L. REV. 609, 614-25
(1982).
6. Corporate campaign contributions and expenditures in candidate elections cur-
rently are regulated by the Federal Corrupt Practices Act, 2 U.S.C.
§ 441(b)(1988), and the Federal Election Campaign Act, 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-456 (1988
& Supp. 1 1989).
7. First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
8. See, e.g., Prentice, Consolidated Edison and Bellotti: First Amendment Protec-
tion of Corporate Political Speech, 16 TULSA L.J. 599 (1981).
9. See infra text accompanying notes 247-75.
10. See Buchholz, supra note 3, at 65-66; Prentice, supra note 8, at 656.
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danger. Recent scholarly suggestions, such as Carl Mayer's proposed
constitutional amendment to declare corporations excluded from the
Bill of Rights," would do away with all corporate rights of free
speech. More importantly, in a series of decisions culminating with
Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce,'2 the Supreme Court has
redefined political "corruption," setting the stage to reconsider Bellotti
and deny first amendment protection to corporate political speech.
This Article will describe the ballot issue process in America and
will examine the rise and likely fall of first amendment protection for
corporate political speech on ballot issues. Additionally, it will evalu-
ate three major criticisms of the Bellotti decision: first, that corpora-
tions are not "persons" worthy of constitutional protection; second,
that corporate political spending impermissibly infringes on share-
holder rights; and, third, that corporate spending on ballot issues un-
duly influences, and thereby corrupts, the direct legislative process.
Finally, this Article will analyze proposed solutions to the problem of
lopsided spending in ballot issue campaigns, and will take the position
that the governmental interest in eliminating "unfair political advan-
tages" would be served more equitably by legislation limiting political
expenditures by all individuals and groups than it would by denying
corporations the protection of the first amendment.
II. DIRECT DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA
A. Direct Democracy Defined
During the past twenty years, American politics has experienced a
resurgence in the use of direct democracy.' 3 "Direct democracy" and
"direct legislation" refer to the initiative or referendum process,
whereby individuals, as opposed to elected representatives, speak di-
rectly on public policy issues by voting on ballot propositions. The
most frequently cited reason for the increasing importance of direct
democracy is the public's growing distrust of representative govern-
ment, which heightened following the Watergate scandals. Specifi-
cally, proponents of direct legislation claim it encourages citizen
participation in government by placing substantive decision-making
power in the hands of the people, thereby bypassing corrupt legisla-
tors who are controlled by special interests.14 At the same time, direct
11. Mayer, Personalizing the Impersona" Corporations and the Bill of Rights, 41
HASTINGS L.J. 577, 660-61 (1990).
12. 110 S. Ct. 1391 (1990), noted in The Saga Continues-Corporate Political Free
Speech and the Constitutionality of Campaign Finance Reform: Austin v. Michi-
gan Chamber of Commerce, 24 CREIGHTON L. REV. 195 (1991).
13. D. MAGLEBY, DIRECT LEGISLATION: VOTING ON BALLOT PROPOSITIONS IN THE
UNITED STATES, 5-7, 25-26 (1984). For a list of the number of ballot propositions
voted on by each state from 1968 to 1982, see id. at app. C.
14. MAGLEBY, supra note 13, at 14-15. Other reasons for this upsurge include the
[Vol. 70:689
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legislation has been criticized because of the large dollar amounts
spent in initiative and referendum campaigns.' 5
Although statutes vary from state to state, two basic types of ballot
propositions are used to implement direct legislation. The initiative is
a procedure whereby citizens can initiate legislation and/or state con-
stitutional amendments by petition, without legislative action.1 6 The
second type of ballot question is the referendum, which provides for
popular vote on proposed or existing laws. Citizens have the power to
accept or reject laws proposed or enacted by the legislature when
these laws are referred to them by petition or by the legislature it-
self.17 Only fourteen states' s do not use either process for statewide
legislation. However, local ballot propositions flourish across the na-
tion, even in some of the states that do not permit them at the state
level.19
B. History of Direct Democracy
Although plebiscitary democracy can be traced back to ancient
Athens, the process did not take hold in America until the beginning
growth of single-issue politics and the corresponding weakening of political par-
ties, as well as the extensive media attention given to ballot issues. Id. at 5-7.
15. In 1982, for example, proponents and opponents of two Michigan ballot questions,
proposing limits on automatic rate modifications for fuel costs, broke previous
state records with combined spending totals of $5.69 million. B. ZISK, MONEY,
MEDIA AND THE GRASS RooTs, 201 (1987). The same year, California campaigners
set a national record for a single ballot question by spending $9.9 million on a gun
control initiative. Id. at 204.
For a detailed discussion of the pros and cons of direct democracy, see T.
CRONiN, DnREcT DEMOCRACY: THE POLMrCS OF INrATIVE, REFERENDUM, AND
RECALL 10-11 (1989); S. LYDENBERG, BANKROLLNG BALLOTS UPDATE 1980 1012
(1981); and MAGLEBY, supra note 13, at 27-30.
16. Twenty-six states and the District of Columbia have adopted some form of the
initiative. Fifteen states use the "direct" initiative whereby petitions containing a
certain number of voter signatures are required for ballot status. Eight states
provide for the "indirect" or "statutory" initiative pursuant to which voter pro-
posals must be considered by the state legislature after the required number of
signatures are obtained. Only if the legislature fails to act on the proposal within
a certain time limit is the proposal placed on the ballot. Five of these eight states
provide for both the direct and indirect initiative procedure. An additional three
states allow voters to require the legislature to refer enactments to the public for
ultimate approval or rejection. Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99
YALE L.J. 1503, 1509 n.22, 1587-88 (1990); MAGLEBY, supra note 13, at 36.
17. Thirty-six states and the District of Columbia use some form of the referendum
process for state statutes (including 24 that also have the initiative). Every state
except Delaware provides for voter approval of state constitutional amendments.
Eule, supra note 16, at 1509-10.
18. Alabama, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Indiana, Louisiana, Minnesota, Missis-
sippi, New Hampshire, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, and West
Virginia. Id. at 1510 n.23.
19. It has been estimated that statewide ballot propositions represent only about two
percent of the country's direct legislation. Id. at 1510.
1991]
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of the twentieth century.20 At that time, Progressives championed so-
cial, economic, and political reforms that reflected belief in the indi-
vidual citizen and distrust of political and economic organizations.2 1
Progressives supported direct democracy as a way to overthrow pow-
erful political machines and transfer power from special interest
groups back to the individual.22
The Progressive movement had lost momentum by 1920, however,
and interest in direct legislation died, partially because very few states
used the process with any regularity.23 But by the late 1970s, direct
democracy had become a serious political phenomenon again,24 and
states that had legislated for direct democracy began to use it.25 In the
November 1988 elections, a total of 230 local and statewide initiatives
and referenda appeared on the ballots in a total of forty-one states-
the most ballot propositions placed before voters in fifty years.26
Despite widespread popular support,2 7 the direct legislative process
has been controversial both during the Progressive era and today.28
Recent criticism of direct democracy has centered primarily on the
apparent conflict between the intended purpose of direct democracy-
to remove government from the hands of the special interests-and
20. MAGLEBY, supra note 13, at 3. In 1898, South Dakota became the first state to
adopt the initiative. Twenty-one states had followed suit by 1918, most of which
were located in the West and Midwest. Id. at 38-40.
21. See generally R. HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM 254-69 (1955)(discussion of
Progressive philosophy and political changes initiated by Progressives, including
initiatives, referendums, and recalls).
22. ZISK, supra note 15, at 13-14.
23. MAGLEBY, supra note 13, at 5.
24. In 1977 congressional hearings were held on a proposed constitutional amend-
ment to establish a national initiative.
Voter Initiative Constitutional Amendment Hearings on S.J. Res. 67 Before
the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 9-11 (1977)(introduced by Sen. Abourezk). The amendment,
which was endorsed by Ralph Nader, was shown by public opinion polls to have
significant popular support. MAGLEBY, supra note 13, at 13, 77. Furthermore,
during the 1980s, at least 20 states considered legislation to either establish some
form of direct legislation or enlarge existing procedures. Id. at 1.
25. MAGLEBY, supra note 13, at 70.
26. Eule, supra note 16, at 1517.
27. Two-thirds of the 1009 Americans questioned in a 1987 Gallup poll replied that
citizens should be able to vote directly on some state and local laws. CRONIN,
supra note 15, at 4.
28. Direct democracy has been challenged as an unconstitutional denial of the fed-
eral obligation to provide republican government pursuant to Article IV, Section
4 of the Constitution. See, e.g., Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. Oregon,
223 U.S. 118 (1912)(status of Oregon initiative held to be nonjusticiable political
question). But see City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enter., Inc., 426 U.S. 668
(1976)(referendum not found to be a delegation of power). See generally CRONIN,
supra note 15, at 34-37; Linde, When is Initiative Lawmaking Not Republican
Government?, 17 HAsTINGS CONST. L.Q. 159 (1990).
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the massive increase in corporate spending on ballot issues.29 Concern
over corporate dominance of ballot propositions in the 1970s resulted
in numerous state statutes prohibiting or limiting corporate contribu-
tions and expenditures in state referendum questions.3 0 In 1978, the
U.S. Supreme Court in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti 31 in-
validated a Massachusetts statute limiting corporate expenditures in
ballot issues, in a decision that for the first time considered the role of
corporate spending in the process of direct democracy.
III. THE RISE OF CORPORATE SPEECH
At the same time as the revival in interest in direct democracy, the
Supreme Court began to grant constitutional protection to two types
of corporate speech: commercial and political. In the commercial
speech cases, the Court granted first amendment protection to truth-
ful, nondeceptive advertising: advertising that did not "corrupt" the
economic process. And in the political speech cases, the Court granted
first amendment protection to corporate political expenditures in bal-
lot issue campaigns, reasoning that such spending presented no threat
of corruption to the political process.
A. Commercial Speech
In the mid-1970s, the Court reversed precedent and awarded first
amendment legitimacy to commercial speech in a series of cases that
recognized the value of advertising in a free market economy.32 In
1980, the right of commercial speech was extended to corporations in
Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission.33
In Central Hudson, the Supreme Court struck down the New York
Public Service Commission's ban on advertising by electric utilities as
violative of the first amendment. Justice Powell, writing for an eight-
to-one court, established a three-part test to determine the constitu-
tionality of any government regulation of truthful, nondeceptive ad-
vertising that concerns lawful activities. First, the government must
assert a substantial state interest to justify the regulation. Second, the
29. See, e.g., Mastro, Costlow & Sanchez, Taking the Initiative: Corporate Control of
Referendum Process Through Media Spending and What to Do About It, 32 FED.
COM. L.J. 315 (1980); Wright, supra note 5, at 622-25.
30. For a list of state statutes that attempted to limit corporate dominance in the
initiative/referendum process, see Easley, Buying Back the First Amendment-
Regulation of Disproportionate Corporate Spending in Ballot Issue Campaigns,
17 GA. L. REV. 675, 681 n.33 (1983).
31. First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
32. Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Vir-
ginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976). In each case, the Court
based its holding on the listener's first amendment right to receive information.
33. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
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government must show that the regulation directly advances that
state interest. Third, the regulation must be narrowly drawn so as to
be no more intrusive on first amendment rights than necessary to
serve this state interest.3 4 If the state can meet these three require-
ments, the advertising in question may be restricted or prohibited.
Applying these guidelines to the Central Hudson facts, the Court
found that the commission's rule was overbroad. Although the com-
mission's interest in conserving fuel was found by the Court to be sub-
stantial, the Court reasoned that less intrusive action (such as
promotional advertisements promoting energy conservation) could
have adequately served that interest.35 The lone dissenter, Justice
Rehnquist, objected that by balancing first amendment rights against
state interests, the Court was improperly substituting its judgment for
that of the state legislature.36
B. Political Speech
1. Buckley v. Valeo
With respect to political speech, the Court in 1976 upheld campaign
contribution limits and invalidated political expenditure limits im-
posed by the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA),37 based on the
Court's perception of the risk of political corruption associated with
each. By characterizing political spending as speech rather than con-
duct, the Court in Buckley v. Valeo3 s subjected political spending lim-
its to strict judicial scrutiny.39
In that case, the Court, in a per curiam opinion, upheld limits on
federal campaign contributions as necessary to protect the electoral
process from corruption or the appearance of corruption associated
with large campaign donations to political candidates.4 0 Corruption,
as defined by the Court, was limited to the exchange of political favors
for campaign contributions-what the Court termed "quid pro quo ar-
rangements" between candidates and their supporters. 41
On the other hand, the Court invalidated FECA's expenditure lim-
itations as "direct and substantial restraints on the quantity of political
speech."42 Unlike the contribution limits, the Court said the expendi-
ture limits could not be justified as an attempt by Congress to prevent
34. Id. at 566.
35. Id. at 569-70.
36. Id. at 584-85.
37. 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-456 (1988 & Supp. I 1989).
38. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
39. For a critical analysis of the Court's conclusion that money is speech, see Wright,
Politics and the Constitution: Is Money Speech?, 85 YALE L.J. 1001 (1976).
40. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, at 23-38.
41. Id. at 26-27.
42. Id. at 39.
[Vol. 70:689
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corruption or the appearance of corruption.43 The Court was con-
vinced the lack of prearrangement between a candidate and a spender
in the expenditure context would eliminate any danger of quid pro
quo arrangements. 44
Although it had been argued that the expenditure restrictions
served the public interest by equalizing the ability of persons and
groups to be heard in election campaigns, the Court emphatically de-
nied the government's ability to do this, stating that "the concept that
government may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in
order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the
First Amendment."45 And with respect to the government's asserted
interest in reducing the costs of political campaigns,46 the Court held
that the government is precluded by the first amendment from con-
trolling the amount of spending-and therefore the amount of
speech-in political debate.47
In a separate opinion, Justice White argued that the expenditure
limitations were content-neutral regulations regarding the giving and
spending of money that affected speech only indirectly.48 Justice
White stated that it made no sense for the Court to accept Congress'
judgment that political contributions pose a danger of illegal political
favors while rejecting Congress' judgment that expenditures also pose
such a danger.4 9
Buckley v. Valeo is important to corporate political speech because
it overturned federal political expenditure limits, and identified the
exchange of political favors ("quid pro quo corruption") as the only
justifiable government interest for spending prohibitions. By viewing
candidates but not elections as subject to the corrupting influence of
money, the Court implied that any limitations on ballot issue cam-
paign spending, including corporate expenditures, would be
unconstitutional.o
2. First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti
The second landmark corporate political speech case presented the
very question addressed by this Article-can corporations constitu-
43. Id. at 45.
44. Id. at 46-47.
45. Id. at 48-49.
46. The Court of Appeals had stressed that spending for federal elections had in-
creased almost 300% between 1952 and 1972. Id. at 57.
47. "The First Amendment denies government the power to determine that spending
to promote one's political views is wasteful, excessive, or unwise." Id.
48. Id. at 259.
49. Id. at 261.
50. Before Buckley was decided, 18 states had enacted legislation prohibiting or limit-
ing corporate expenditures in ballot proposition elections. CRoNiN, supra note 15,
at 101-02.
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tionally be prevented from spending in ballot issue campaigns? In
1978, the Court ruled by a five-to-four margin that they could not. In
that case, First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,5 ' the Court invali-
dated a Massachusetts statute52 that forbade corporations from mak-
ing contributions or expenditures in regard to state referendum
questions that did not materially affect their property or business.
In an opinion by Justice Powell, the Court began by describing the
plaintiffs' proposed speech as being "at the heart of the First Amend-
ment".53 According to Justice Powell, political speech is worthy of
constitutional protection because it furthers the open and informed
discussion that is required for self government-regardless of whether
the speech comes from an individual or a corporation.54 As it did in
the earlier commercial speech cases, the Court focused on the public's
right to receive information, rather than on any corporate right of
expression. 55
Second, the Court rejected the state court's reasoning that, as
against a state, any first amendment rights belonging to corporations
stem from their property rights under the fourteenth amendment.56
Rather, the Court said that freedom of speech for both individuals and
corporations falls within the right to liberty safeguarded by the four-
teenth amendment. 57 The Court also discredited the idea that media
corporations are entitled to greater first amendment privileges than
ordinary business corporations, stating that "the press does not have a
monopoly on either the First Amendment or the ability to
enlighten."58
Massachusetts proffered two legitimating state interests for its
statute: (1) that it encouraged individuals to participate in govern-
ment, thereby avoiding corruption and maintaining public confidence
in the electoral process;59 and (2) that it protected shareholders whose
political views differed from those held by management.60 The Court
51. First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
52. MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 55 § 8 (West Supp. 1977)(amended 1986).
53. First Nat'l Bank of Boston, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978).
54. Id. at 777.
55. Id. at 776.
56. id- at 778.
57. Id. at 780.
58. Id. at 782. Prior Court decisions granting first amendment rights to either media
corporations or commercial speech were decided not because the speech per-
tained to the corporations' businesses, Justice Powell said, but rather because the
speech furthered the public's interest in open access to information. Id. at 781-82.
This distinction between first amendment rights given those corporations which
could claim freedom of the press and non-media corporations dated from Gros-
jean v. American Press Co, 297 U.S. 233 (1936). See infra note 205 and accompa-
nying text.
59. 435 U.S. 765, 787 (1978).
60. Id.
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was unimpressed with the corruption argument in the context of a
referendum issue, noting that it might suffice as a compelling interest
where partisan candidate elections were involved.61 However, the
Court said Massachusetts had failed to show any evidence or legisla-
tive findings indicating that corporate advocacy in a referendum
would exert an undue influence on the outcome of the vote. 62 Mere
persuasive effect, Justice Powell said, does not negate first amend-
ment protection. 63
The Court also rejected Massachusetts' contention that the statute
protected shareholders, finding that the law failed to do so by reason
of being both over- and underinclusive.64 The fact that the statute
prohibited a corporation from supporting a referendum even if its
shareholders unanimously authorized the expenditure made it overin-
clusive, in the Court's opinion.65 The Court found the statute to be
underinclusive because, while it disallowed corporate expenditures, it
did not prohibit corporate activities (such as lobbying) in support of a
referendum position.66 Furthermore, in order to protect shareholders
or other members of large, wealthy associations, the statute logically
should have included business and investment trusts and labor unions.
The Court was not convinced that shareholders were even in need of
protection to begin with; the Court said that normally, shareholders
can protect themselves through their power to elect the board of direc-
tors, to insist on protective provisions in the corporate charter, and to
bring derivative court actions to contest specific corporate
expenditures.6 7
In a dissent joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, Justice
White stated that the first amendment rights of individuals deserve
greater protection than those of for-profit corporations. 68 State regu-
lation of corporate political speech was seen by Justice White not as
unconstitutional "equalization" of resources, but rather as preventing
wealthy, state-created corporations from purchasing an unfair advan-
61. Id. at 788.
62. According to appellee, corporations are wealthy and powerful and their
views may drown out other points of view. If appellee's arguments were
supported by record or legislative findings that corporate advocacy
threatened imminently to undermine democratic processes, thereby den-
igrating First Amendment interests, these arguments would merit our
consideration .... But there has been no showing that the relative voice
of corporations has been overwhelming or even significant in influencing
referenda in Massachusetts, or that there has been any threat to the con-
fidence of the citizenry in government.
Id. at 789.
63. Id. at 790.
64. Id. at 792-94.
65. Id at 794.
66. Id at 793.
67. Id. at 794-95.
68. Id at 807.
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tage in the electoral process. 69 Justice White predicted that even a
complete prohibition of corporate political speech would not signifi-
cantly reduce open discussion of ideas because individual corporate ex-
ecutives, employees, and shareholders would still be free to express
their individual views, at their own individual expense.70
In his dissent, Justice Rehnquist argued that a corporation does not
share all the constitutional rights of natural persons, but rather only
those that are "necessarily incidental" to the corporation's business.71
These "necessary" rights, Justice Rehnquist said, would include prop-
erty rights under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment
for all business corporations, publication rights under the first amend-
ment for media corporations, and commercial speech rights for some
business corporations.72
However, Justice Rehnquist was of the opinion that the right of
political expression is not equally necessary for all commercial corpo-
rations.73 States may logically conclude, Justice Rehnquist said, that
corporations pose special dangers in the realm of politics by virtue of
the advantages granted to them under state law.74 In this case, Massa-
chusetts allowed corporations the right of political speech regarding
matters concerning their property, thereby providing as much first
amendment protection as Justice Rehnquist believed was required by
the fourteenth amendment. 75
In analyzing the Bellotti ruling, it is especially important in light of
later cases to note the government interests rejected by the Court as
insufficient to support Massachusetts' legislation. The protection of
dissenting shareholders, the prevention of undue influence resulting
from corporate advocacy, and the equalization of political opportunity
were all spurned by the Bellotti majority as rationales to justify spend-
ing restrictions. The Court appeared to say that corporate political ad-
vocacy in ballot issue campaigns could be limited only if it could be
proved to exert undue influence on the democratic process; however,
the Court went on to emphasize that advocacy could not be considered
corruptive just because it was effective.7 6
The immediate effect of the Buckley and Bellotti decisions was in-
creased spending on ballot propositions by business corporations.77
State statutes forbidding corporate expenditures in ballot issue cam-
69. Id. at 809.
70. Id. at 807-09.
71. Id. at 824-25.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 825-27.
74. Id at 826-27.
75. Id. at 827-28.
76. Id at 790-92.
77. LYDENBERG, supra note 15, at 26.
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paigns were repealed or judicially invalidated.7 8 However, many state
and local governments retained limits on corporate contributions to
political committees in referendum and initiative campaigns.79
3. Consolidated Edison v. Public Service Commission
Two years after Bellotti and on the same day as the Central Hud-
son decision, the Court again confirmed that first amendment protec-
tion for corporate political speech is based on the rationale that the
public has the right to be exposed to political ideas from all sources.
In Consolidated Edison v. Public Service Commission,8 0 the Court in-
validated the New York public service commission's regulation
prohibiting private utility corporations from issuing bill inserts deal-
ing with controversial public policy matters.
The Court treated Consolidated Edison as a case of political, not
commercial, speech even though the utility obviously had an economic
interest in furthering its own cause. In Central Hudson, commercial
speech had been defined as an "expression related solely to the eco-
nomic interests of the speaker and its audience" and "speech propos-
ing a commercial transaction."81 Consolidated Edison refined this
definition and held that corporate speech concerning issues of public
policy should be characterized as political speech even if it directly or
indirectly affected the corporation's business. The existence of an eco-
nomic motive was no longer dispositive. Comparing Consolidated
Edison and Central Hudson shows that political speech was given a
higher degree of protection under the first amendment than commer-
cial speech.
4. Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley
In 1981 in Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley,8 2 the
Supreme Court reiterated its position that no danger of political cor-
ruption exists in the referendum or initiative process. That case in-
volved a City of Berkeley campaign ordinance limiting contributions
to political committees to $250 in both candidate elections and ballot
measures. In order to comply with Bellotti, the ordinance specifically
did not limit independent or corporate expenditures.
The California Supreme Court83 upheld the Berkeley ordinance as
furthering the compelling governmental interest in preventing cor-
ruption of the political process by excessive special interest group
78. Id.
79. Gray, Corporate Identity and Corporate Political Activities, 21 AM. Bus. L.J. 439,
456 (1984).
80. 447 U.S. 530 (1980).
81. Central Hudson Gas v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 561-62 (1980).
82. 454 U.S. 290 (1981).
83. 27 Cal. 3d 819, 614 P.2d 745 (1980).
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spending. The state court maintained that ballot issue campaigns
could be "corrupted" by the dominating influence of big spenders who
stifle individual participation, resulting in voter disillusionment with
the political process.8 4
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the state court by a vote of eight
to one, relying primarily on the first amendment's guarantee of free-
dom of association. The Berkeley ordinance placed contribution limits
only on those wishing to donate funds to political committees; contrib-
utors were free to make unlimited independent expenditures. The
Court thought that this hindered the ability of a group to pool its re-
sources to amplify its members' voices.8 5
The Court distinguished Buckley as involving candidate contribu-
tion limits, which it said were justified as an attempt to eliminate the
danger of actual or apparent quid pro quo exchanges between candi-
dates and contributions. Where ballot measures are involved, the
Court stated that this danger of political corruption did not exist.8 6 In
other words, the Court viewed contributions to political committees in
ballot issue elections more like independent expenditures than candi-
date contributions.
Justice Rehnquist concurred in the opinion of the Court because
the ordinance applied to both individuals and corporations. Had the
ordinance applied solely to corporations, Justice Rehnquist said he
would have upheld it.s7 Corporations, in his view, must subject them-
selves to state regulation of speech and association in exchange for the
special corporate advantages granted to them by the state.8 8
Justice White again dissented from the Court's decision, stating
that the ordinance constituted no more than a negligible intrusion on
expression and association.8 9 Although he disagreed with the Court's
opinion that ballot measures pose no dangers of quid pro quo ex-
changes between contributors and candidates, Justice White also ques-
tioned why the Court refused to consider other possible interests that
could justify the ordinance, such as the government's concern with up-
holding the individual citizen's confidence in political processes.9 0
84. Citizens Against Rent Control v. Berkley, 454 U.S. 290, 293 (1981).
85. ' To place a Spartan limit-or indeed any limit--on individuals wishing to band
together to advance their views on a ballot measure, while placing none on indi-
viduals acting alone, is clearly a restraint on the right of association." Id. at 296.
86. Id. at 297.
87. See id. at 300.
88. Id. See also First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 825-27
(1978)(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
89. Id. at 304.
90. Id. at 306. White cited statistics from a 1981 California Fair Political Practices
Commission report which stated that large contributions from corporate sources
have contributed to a steady erosion of the private individual's influence in poli-
tics. White also referred to studies purporting to show that large contributions
can "skew" the outcome of local ballot measure campaigns. Id. nn.2-3.
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After the Buckley, Bellotti, and Berkeley decisions, commentators
began to question the constitutionality of FECA's prohibition on di-
rect corporate contributions and expenditures in federal elections.9 1
However, Berkeley turned out to be the last of the Supreme Court
cases to rely on quid pro quo exchanges as the only type of political
corruption sufficient to justify abridgement of political speech. Begin-
ning in 1982, the Court apparently reexamined its reasoning in these
corporate political speech cases and began adopting the arguments
made by Justice White and current Chief Justice Rehnquist in their
Bellotti dissents.
IV. THE DECLINE OF CORPORATE POLITICAL SPEECH
Although Bellotti did not go so far as to expressly grant first
amendment rights to corporations, the decision left considerable doubt
whether any restriction on corporate political spending would be up-
held. The Court in Bellotti gave little consideration to legislative dis-
cretion; however, Justice Powell implied that if and when the state
could offer evidence that corporate speech undermined the democratic
process, the problem would deserve reconsideration.2 In 1982, the
Court decided the first of a series of cases that signaled a turnaround
in judicial policy from its Bellotti decision. In this more recent line of
cases, the Court has redefined "corruption" in the political process and
has approved the same governmental interests it rejected in Bellotti:
the protection of minority shareholders from forced endorsement of
management's speech, the equalization of speech in political cam-
paigns, and the prevention of corporate domination in political
campaigns.
A. FEC v. National Right to Work Committee
In FEC v. National Right to Work Committee (NRWC)93, the
Supreme Court held that a narrow interpretation of who a corporation
can solicit for PAC contributions under FECA did not violate the con-
tributors' first amendment rights of association under Buckley.94 In
an opinion written by Justice Rehnquist, the Court stated that two
91. Garrison, Corporate Political Speech. Campaign Spending, and First Amendment
Doctrine, 27 Am. Bus. L.J. 163, 190 (1989).
Federal law prohibits corporations from making direct contributions to candi-
dates for federal office. Instead, corporations may create separate segregated
funds (commonly referred to as political action committees, or PACs) that are
financed by the voluntary contributions of their shareholders and officers, or, in
the case of nonstock corporations, their members. 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2)(C)(1988).
92. First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 789 (1978).
93. 459 U.S. 197 (1982).
94. Id. at 207.
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governmental interests were sufficient to justify the limitation on per-
sons who could be solicited by a nonprofit corporation.
The first compelling interest cited by the Court was the prevention
of actual or potential political corruption resulting from corporate can-
didate contributions. 95 The Court's discussion of political corruption
did not center around quid pro quo arrangements between corpora-
tions and candidates as in Buckley and Bellotti, but rather focused on
the singular nature of corporations. State law provides certain advan-
tages to corporations that encourage the accumulation of capital and
corporate productivity, and the Court suggested that this wealth af-
fords corporations an unfair advantage when corporate monies are
spent in the political arena.96 The Court thereby accepted the view
first articulated in Justice White's dissent in Bellotti that the state-
granted benefits of the corporate form justify government regulation
of corporate political contributions.
Second, the Court concluded that the regulation was necessary to
protect persons who contribute to corporations for purposes other
than supporting political candidates.97 The Court reasoned that corpo-
rate contributors should not end up subsidizing political speech with
which they might not agree.98 In effect, the Court was relying on the
protection of shareholders argument it rejected in Bellotti for being
both under and overinclusive. And for good measure, the Court also
mentioned the erosion of public confidence in the electoral process
through the appearance of corruption as a possible compelling interest
for government regulation of corporate campaign spending.99
Clearly, NRWC differed from Bellotti in that it involved corporate
candidate contributions instead of corporate political expenditures in
ballot issues. Nevertheless, the Court's reasoning in NRWC remains
clearly inconsistent with its reasoning in Bellotti. The Court in Bel-
lotti was intent on protecting political expression regardless of the
identity of the speaker. By contrast, in NRWC, the Court justified
broad state power to control corporate political spending--even with
respect to a nonprofit, issue-oriented corporation like the National
Right to Work Committee.
B. FEC v. National Conservative Political Action Committee
In 1985, the Court again took up the issue of corporate political
expenditures, in FEC v. National Conservative Political Action Com-
95. Id. at 207-08.
96. 'The statute reflects a legislative judgment that the special characteristics of the
corporate structure require particularly careful regulation." Id. at 209-10.
97. Id at 207-08.
98. See id at 208.
99. Id.
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mittee (NCPAC).1oo In that case, the Supreme Court by a seven-to-
two vote invalidated a Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act
(PECFA) provision limiting political committees' independent ex-
penditures to $1000 on behalf of any presidential candidate receiving
public financing.iO' Referring to the expenditure/contribution dichot-
omy established in Buckley, the Court said that the PECFA limitation
violated the first amendment rights of PAC contributors to pool their
resources in order to express their views.102
In holding that no compelling governmental interest existed to
support the statute, the Court again cited Buckley for the proposition
that the exchange of political favors for campaign contributions is the
only type of political corruption sufficient to justify campaign financ-
ing limits. The potential for political quid pro quos, described by the
Court as the "hallmark of corruption,"1i 3 involved in uncoordinated,
independent PAC expenditures was seen as too hypothetical to war-
rant restriction.10 4 In reaching this conclusion, the Court emphasized
that the PACs in question received a large number of small, individual
contributions and that the contributors "obviously" agreed with the
PACs' message as evidenced by their donations.105
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, distinguished NRWC as
turning on the National Right to Work Committee's corporate sta-
tus. 06 He described NRWC as illustrating the "well-established con-
stitutional validity" of legislative limits on corporate contributions to
candidates.l07 Bellotti, on the other hand, simply held that corporate
expenditures on general public issues have a higher constitutional sta-
tus than candidate contributions. 0 8 Left open was the question of
whether a corporation could be limited in making independent ex-
penditures that would benefit a candidate.109
100. 470 U.S. 480 (1985).
101. 26 U.S.C. § 9012(f)(1988).
102. FEC v. National Conservative Political Action Group, 470 U.S. 480, 493 (1985).
103. Id. at 497.
104. Id at 498. The FEC's trial court evidence, consisting of high-level Reagan admin-
istration appointments of persons connected with the PACs and newspaper arti-
cles showing a public distrust of PACs, was considered by the Court t o be
inadequate to show actual or apparent corruption. Id. at 499-500.
105. Id. at 495.
106. Although the PACs in NCPAC were incorporated, the Court noted that the chal-
lenged provisions of the PECFA Act applied not only to corporations, but to all
political committees whether incorporated or not. Therefore, because the statute
applied to both informal neighborhood groups as well as to wealthy corporate
PACs, the Court viewed NRWC as inapplicable in the NCPAC case. Id. at 496.
107. Id. at 495. The Court cited NRWC for the proposition that "[i]n return for the
special advantages that the State confers on the corporate form, individuals act-
ing jointly through corporations forgo some of the rights they have as individu-
als." Id.
108. Id. at 495-96.
109. Id.
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Justice White10 dissented on the grounds that the statute was sup-
ported by compelling public interests such as but not limited to the
need to avoid real or apparent political corruption.1 11 Congress acted
reasonably, Justice White said, in believing that PACs have significant
contact with candidates such that the threat of corruption is not elimi-
nated when contributions take the form of independent expendi-
tures.112 Other government interests that Justice White believed
were served by the legislation included maintaining public confidence
in the integrity of federal elections, equalizing the resources available
to candidates, holding down overall campaign costs, and reinforcing
the legislative limits on direct campaign contributions. 113
What are the implications of NRWC and NCPAC on corporate
political expenditures in ballot issue campaigns? In these decisions,
the Court drew a distinction between political spending by business
corporations as opposed to other political groups. In NRWC, the
Court held that corporate political spending could be restricted to pro-
tect dissenting shareholders and to prevent unfair advantages result-
ing from corporate wealth. The NCPAC decision focused on the
associational rights of individual PAC contributors to engage in polit-
ical advocacy. In these two cases, the Court recognized that share-
holders of a business corporation invest not for political reasons, but
for profit motives. The Court had begun to perceive business corpora-
tions, with their state-granted advantages, as a danger to the political
process.
C. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Commission
One year after NCPAC, in 1986, the Supreme Court decided two
cases with very different implications regarding corporate political
speech. In the first, Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Com-
mission,114 a plurality of the Courtl_5 appeared for the first time to
110. Justices Marshall and Brennan also dissented, with Justice Marshall indicating
that he no longer supported the constitutional distinction set forth in Buckley
between political expenditures and contributions. Id. at 521.
111. Id. at 508.
112. Id. at 509.
113. Id. Justice White also noted that although the Court never identified whose first
amendment rights it was protecting, it appeared to emphasize the associational
rights of PAC contributors. Id. at 512-13. But, according to the Court's decision
in California Medical Association v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182 (1981), PAC contributors
do not engage in direct speech; they are merely giving money to an organization.
Justice White pointed out that the Court in California Medical Association char-
acterized PAC donations as speech by proxy, undeserving of full first amendment
protection. FEC v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480,
512-14 (1985).
114. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1 (1986), reh'g denied, 475
U.S. 1133 (1986).
115. Justice Powell's opinion was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Brennan
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recognize a first amendment right belonging directly to business cor-
porations. Justice Powell, writing for a majority of the participating
Justices, analogized a corporate newsletter to the institutional
press,"16 finding the newsletter completely protected by the first
amendment despite its corporate source.117 Unlike his reasoning in
Bellotti, Justice Powell did not invoke the first amendment rights of
the audience in order to conclude that the newsletter rose to the level
of constitutionally protected speech.
For sixty-two years, Pacific Gas & Electric (PG&E) had distributed
a newsletter to its customers in the same envelope as its billing state-
ments.1 18 A consumer interest group, Toward Utility Rate Normaliza-
tion (TURN), asked the state utilities commission to forbid PG&E
from including political editorials in its newsletter on the grounds that
the ratepayers were being forced to subsidize the utility's political
speech. Instead, the commission allocated the space to TURN four
times a year for two years, to use for whatever purposes it desired.119
The Court was unable to agree on an opinion; however, a majority
of the eight participating Justices agreed that the order violated
PG&E's first amendment rights.20 Because the order awarded access
to PG&E's billing envelopes only to those groups that opposed
PG&E's policies, Justice Powell said it created a burden on PG&E's
protected expression. Although PG&E had no right to be free from
opposing viewpoints, the plurality thought PG&E should not be forced
to assist in disseminating those views. PG&E had a right, Justice Pow-
ell said, to "be free from government restrictions that abridge its own
and O'Connor. Justice Marshall concurred in the judgment but wrote a separate
opinion. Id.
116. Justice Powell said that the compelled access rule established in Miami Herald
Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974), applied to the newsletter. Pacific
Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 9-11.(1986). In Miami Herald,
a Florida statute had required newspaper publishers to give victims of unfavora-
ble editorial commentary a right to reply to such charges in the pages of the
newspaper. The Court invalidated the statute because it dampened debate and
interfered with newspapers' editorial judgment. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v.
Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256 (1974).
117. Justice Powell cited Bellotti for the proposition that "[c]orporations and other
associations, like individuals, contribute to the 'discussion, debate, and the dis-
semination of the information and ideas' that the First Amendment seeks to fos-
ter." Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 8 (1986).
118. The newsletter routinely contained political editorials, energy conservation tips,
human interest features, and information about utility services and charges. Id.
at 5.
119. TURN was required to include a disclaimer on its inserts stating that they did not
come from PG&E. Furthermore, the Commission reserved the right to grant ac-
cess to the envelopes to other groups in the future. Id. at 7.
120. For a critical analysis of the Pacijtc Gas & Electric decision, see Note, Pacific Gas
and Electric Co. v. Public Utitilites Commission: The Right to Hear in Corporate
Negative and Affirmative Speech, 73 CoRNELL L. REV. 1080 (1988).
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rights in order to 'enhance the relative voice' of its opponents."121
Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices White and Stevens as to his
first point, had two main objections to the plurality opinion. First, he
said that any deterrent effect on PG&E's speech because of the right
of access granted to TURN was both remote and speculative.12 2 His
second objection to the Court's decision centered on PG&E's corporate
nature. Justice Rehnquist postulated that negative free speech rights
are part of an individual's freedom of conscience; they are recognized
as part of each individual's interest in self-expression and should not,
therefore, be extended to corporations.'m
Justice Stevens also dissented from the Court's decision, viewing
the order as a permissible state regulation of commercial speech. 2 4
Because PG&E's messages were intended to advance the corporation's
commercial interests, whether by political or other means, Justice Ste-
vens said the commission was authorized to require PG&E to include
public interest group messages in its billing envelopes as long as such
messages were reasonably related to the purpose of the billing
statements. -5
Pacific Gas & Electric differs from previous corporate speech cases
because the plurality opinion focuses on the free speech rights of the
corporation, rather than those of the listener. However, Pacific Gas &
Electric did not involve corporate political contributions or expendi-
tures, and falls instead within the realm of the Court's compelled ex-
pression cases, an area where the Court's reasoning has been described
as "neither consistent nor adequate." 12 6
D. FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life
In the second 1986 case, FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life
(MCFL),127 the Supreme Court underwent a striking change in its def-
inition of political corruption that is sufficient to justify political
spending limits, expanding it to include more than just the quid pro
quo arrangements identified in NCPAC and Buckley.'P8 In an opinion
by Justice Brennan, the Court in MCFL held five to four that the pro-
121. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Util. Commn'n, 475 U.S. 1, 14 (1986).
122. Id. at 30 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
123. 'To ascribe to such artificial entities an 'intellect' or 'mind' for freedom of con-
science purposes is to confuse metaphor with reality." Id. at 33.
124. Id. at 36 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
125. Id. at 38-39.
126. Harpaz, Justice Jackson's Flag Salute Legacy: The Supreme Court Struggles to
Protect Intellectual Individualism, 64 TEX. L. REv. 817, 902 (1986).
127. FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238 (1986).
128. This marked change in rationale prompted one commentator to write that "[t]he
implication in Bellotti that spending on referenda or initiatives could not be pro-
hibited absent a showing of imminent danger to the democratic process has been
abandoned by the Supreme Court." Garrison, supra note 91, at 201.
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hibition on direct corporate candidate contributions in FECA section
441b violated the first amendment when applied to a nonprofit, issue-
oriented corporation. 2 9 The decision clearly implied that section 441b
was constitutional with respect to for-profit corporations.
In analyzing whether the burden on political speech imposed by
section 441b as applied to the defendant corporation (MCFL) could be
justified by a compelling state interest, the Court explained that gov-
ernment regulation of corporate political activity was proper to pro-
tect the marketplace of political ideas.3 0 Direct corporate spending
on election matters would not reflect popular support for ideas, but
rather the economic decisions of consumers and shareholders.13'
Although the majority admitted that free political trade in ideas does
not mean that all participants must have exactly equal resources, it
said that government regulation of corporate expenditures is permissi-
ble to eliminate the "corruption" described as the "unfair deployment
of wealth for political purposes." 3 2 While still purporting to rely on
the elimination of "corruption" as the rationale for section 441b, the
Court in effect changed its Bellotti definition of corruption from the
exchange of money for political favors to the elimination of "unfair
advantage" in the political marketplace and opened the door to the
notion that equalization of speech is permissible under the first
amendment.
Because MCFL's corporate purpose involved the dissemination of
ideas rather than the amassing of capital, the Court determined that
the corporation posed no danger of this new type of political corrup-
tion. And although the Court recognized the importance of protecting
shareholders from subsidizing speech they might not support with re-
spect to business corporations, it noted that this rationale also did not
apply to MCFL.133 Any contributor who disagreed with MCFL's par-
ticular expenditures, the Court said, could simply refuse to make fur-
ther donations.134
Based on this analysis, the Court created an exception to section
441b for nonprofit, ideological corporations that (1) are formed for
political purposes and cannot engage in business activities; (2) have no
shareholders or members with a claim on corporate assets or earnings;
and (3) are not established by business corporations or unions and do
129. FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 263 (1986).
130. Id. at 257.
131. Id. at 258.
132. Id. at 259. Corporate political expenditures financed through segregated funds
made up of voluntary contributions, on the other hand, were not seen as involv-
ing this type of corruption because, in the Court's view, these funds more accu-
rately reflect popular support for political positions. Id. at 258.
133. Citizens had no shareholders, but only "contributors" who the Court felt were
fully aware of Citizens' political purposes. Id. at 260-61.
134. Id. at 261.
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not accept contributions from either. 3 5
The dissenters, Chief Justice Rehnquist, along with Justices White,
Blackmun, and Stevens, felt that "special advantages" granted by the
states to nonprofit as well as for-profit corporations warranted re-
stricting all corporate political activity.136 But despite their disagree-
ment regarding the result in MCFL, the dissenters had actually won
the day. The majority opinion had adopted both Justice White's ex-
panded version of political corruption and Chief Justice Rehnquist's
rationale that corporations, as creatures of the state, could be sub-
jected to increased regulation.
E. Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce
In 1990 the Supreme Court answered the question it left open in
NCPAC: whether a corporation's independent expenditures benefit-
ing a candidate could be limited. In Austin v. Michigan Chamber of
Commerce'3 7 the Court upheld a Michigan statute prohibiting corpo-
rations from making such independent expenditures from its general
treasury funds.
In 1985, the Michigan Chamber of Commerce challenged section
54(1) of the Michigan Finance Act 3 8 after the Chamber attempted to
purchase with general treasury funds a newspaper advertisement sup-
porting a particular candidate to the Michigan House of Representa-
tives. In an opinion by Justice Marshall, the Supreme Court held six
to three that the Finance Act did not violate either the first or the
fourteenth amendments. Making a perfunctory reference to Bellotti
for the proposition that the Chamber's incorporated status would not
automatically remove its speech from the protection of the first
amendment, 39 the Court began by affirming that the state had a com-
pelling interest in regulating corporations' political expenditures in
order to avoid corruption or the appearance of corruption. 40
However, Justice Marshall made clear that corruption now meant
something more than the quid pro quo arrangements described as the
'"hallmark of corruption" in NCPAC.141 Because state law grants cor-
porations "special advantages"'142 that allow corporations to be both
profitable and powerful, the Court said the state is justified in restrict-
135. Id. at 264.
136. Id. at 268-69.
137. Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 110 S. Ct. 1391 (1990).
138. McH. COMP. LAWs § 169.254 (1979).
139. Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 110 S. Ct. 1391, 1396 (1990).
140. Id. at 1397.
141. FEC v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 497 (1985).
142. Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 110 S. Ct. 1391, 1397 (1990). The ad-
vantages listed by the Court included limited liability, perpetual life, and
favorable treatment of the accumulation and distribution of assets. Id.
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ing corporate political spending in order to eliminate "a different type
of corruption in the political arena: the corrosive and distorting ef-
fects of immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the
help of the corporate form and that have little or no correlation to the
public's support for the corporation's political ideas."143 In Austin, the
political corruption to be prevented is the possibility that corporations
may use their vast resources to corrode and distort the political
process.
The Court had no trouble finding that the Finance Act was nar-
rowly tailored to eliminate the distortion caused by corporate spend-
ing because corporations could still make independent political
expenditures in support of a candidate through the use of segregated
funds.144 According to the Court, the Finance Act's segregated fund
provision ensured that political expenditures made by corporations re-
flected actual public support for political ideas advanced by such cor-
porations.14 5 And the fact that not all corporations possess "vast
resources" also failed to concern the Court. The statute was not un-
derinclusive, the Court said, because all corporations, large or small,
profitable or not, receive the benefits of corporate structure and there-
fore have the potential for distorting the political process.346
Neither did the Court find the statute overinclusive for applying to
nonprofit corporations such as the Chamber. In so deciding, the
Court distinguished the Chamber from the purely ideological an-
tiabortion organization involved in MCFL in three ways. First, the
Court noted that the Chamber engaged in nonpolitical activities and
had more varied purposes including some which were not inherently
political.147 Second, although the Chamber lacked shareholders, the
Court found that many of its members would be reluctant to give up
their membership even if they opposed the proposed advertisement. 48
Therefore, the Court described the Chamber's members as more like
shareholders of a business corporation than the members of a purely
political group. Finally, the Court noted that the Chamber was obvi-
ously not free from the influence of business corporations because
most of its members were for-profit corporations.14 9 If the Chamber
were to be excluded from the Finance Act, the Court said that busi-
143. Id.
144. Id. at 1398.
145. Id.
146. "[W]e accept Congress' judgment that it is the potential for such influence that
demands regulation." Id. (emphasis in original).
147. Id. at 1399.
148. The Court believed that members who disagreed with the Chamber's political
views might retain their memberships in order to maintain business contacts or
to participate in the Chamber's educational activities. Id.
149. Approximately three-fourths of the Chamber's members were business corpora-
tions. Id. at 1400.
1991]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
ness corporations could in effect escape the Finance Act's provisions
by funneling money through the Chamber's general treasury. 5 0
By agreeing that the state was justified in regulating only corpora-
tions (and not unincorporated associations such as labor unions) be-
cause of the legal advantages given by state law only to corporations,
the Court was able to dispose of the Chamber's equal protection argu-
ment.' 5 ' Furthermore, the Court held that the Finance Act's media
exemption was permissible under the fourteenth amendment because
it protected the press' unique societal role and ensured that the Fi-
nance Act did not prevent stories and editorials about newsworthy
events.152
Justice Brennan's concurring opinion emphasized that the Finance
Act served a distinct state interest by preventing business corpora-
tions from forcing shareholders to subsidize political speech with
which they disagree.5 3
Justice Stevens also wrote a brief concurring opinion stating that
the danger of actual or apparent corruption of elected officials pro-
vided an adequate justification for state regulation of corporate partic-
ipation in candidate elections.154 Justice Stevens, however, did not
necessarily intend for the decision's rationale to be extended to the
referendum or initiative context.
Justice Scalia wrote a scathing, lengthy dissent in which he ob-
jected both to the Court's new definition of corruption and to the no-
tion that equalization of speech is permissible under the first
amendment. He agreed with the Court that certain uses of "massive
wealth" in the electoral process pose a possibility of corruption that
would justify regulation of speech. Indeed, when money is given di-
rectly to a candidate, Scalia said that such a danger exists-the risk of
the quid pro quo arrangements outlawed in Buckley.55 But here, Jus-
tice Scalia said, the Court has redefined corruption to mean any poten-
tial "corrosive" influence of corporate wealth. 5 6 By requiring that
corporate political expenditures reflect actual public support for the
political ideas expressed, Justice Scalia said the Court has adopted the
150. Id.
151. Id. at 1401.
152. Id. at 1401-02.
153. "[Ihe statute merely requires those corporations wishing to make independent
expenditures in support of candidates to do so through segregated funds or polit-
ical action committees (PACs) rather than directly from the corporate treasur-
ies." Id. at 1402.
154. Justice Stevens cited Bellotti to emphasize "there is a vast difference between
lobbying and debating public issues on the one hand, and political campaigns for
election to public office on the other." Id. at 1407. In other words, Stevens agreed
with the Court's decision because it was a candidate election case.
155. Id. at 1409-10.
156. Id. at 1411.
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"equalizing" approach to political expenditures that was specifically
rejected by the Court in Buckley.157
In response to Justice Brennan's concern for the protection of
shareholders, Justice Scalia argued that the Finance Act actually pro-
tected political candidates more than it did dissenting shareholders.s5 8
The Finance Act permitted corporations to take as many ideological
and political positions as they pleased, so long as they were not "in
assistance of, or in opposition to, the nomination or election of a candi-
date."'159 Furthermore, Justice Scalia asserted that even if the Fi-
nance Act did protect shareholders, that would not be a sufficient
compelling need to support the resulting restriction on political
speech.160 Shareholders invest in corporations to make a profit, and
they know that management may make some decisions to which they
are ideologically opposed in pursuit of that profit. Shareholders are
adequately protected either by selling their stock or by their ability to
organize and oppose such actions, Justice Scalia said.161
Finally, Justice Scalia maintained that the Finance Act's exception
for media corporations could not be justified by the Court's rationale
of preventing disproportionate expression of political views. 6 2 Media
corporations, he asserted, have both greater power and greater oppor-
tunity to overinform. Therefore, the unique societal role of the press
mentioned by the Court actually provides an especially strong reason
to include it, rather than exclude it, from the Finance Act.163
Justice Kennedy also wrote a dissenting opinion, which was joined
by Justices Scalia and O'Connor, in which he objected to the Court's
decision because it upheld a direct restriction on the independent ex-
penditure of funds for political speech. 6 4 He noted that Michigan ad-
mitted, apparently during oral argument, that among those
communications prohibited by the Finance Act were the publication
by a nonprofit corporation of its own assessment of a candidate's vot-
ing record. "[I]t is now a felony in Michigan for the Sierra Club, or the
American Civil Liberties Union, or the Michigan State Chamber of
Commerce, to advise the public how a candidate voted on issues of
urgent concern to their members." 65
157. Id. at 1411. Justice Scalia boiled the Court's rationale down to the following state-
ment: "Since those private associations known as corporations have so much
money, they will speak so much more, and their views will be given inordinate
prominence in election campaigns." Id. at 1416.
158. Id. at 1412.
159. Id. at 1411.
160. Id. at 1412.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 1414.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 1416.
165. Id. at 1418. However, assuming that it is independent from the influence of busi-
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After Austin, what is the status of corporate political speech in the
initiative or referendum context? Although Austin involved a candi-
date election rather than a ballot issue campaign, the Court in effect
discarded the Bellotti rationale by redefining "corruption" as the "cor-
rosion" resulting from the impact of corporate wealth in the political
process. Additionally, the Court in Austin accepted the very govern-
ment interests rejected in Bellotti as justifications for limits on corpo-
rate speech, conceiving of corporations as "state-created" entities
subject to unlimited state regulation. Furthermore, the Austin Court
upheld an expenditure limit, without expressing any concern for the
Buckley distinction between expenditures and contributions. Should
the question of whether corporations have a first amendment right to
participate in ballot issue campaigns come before the Court again, the
Bellotti decision could be overruled. Therefore, it is crucial to ask
whether Bellotti in fact should be overruled.
V. ARE CORPORATIONS "PERSONS"?
One fundamental criticism of the Bellotti decision is that it as-
sumes that corporations are "persons" entitled to the protection of the
Bill of Rights.166 In fact, corporations are never mentioned in the
Constitution or the Bill of Rights; these documents speak only of "per-
sons" and "citizens." How, then, can constitutional rights that appear
to belong only to individuals be asserted by corporations?
In determining questions of corporate constitutional rights, the
Supreme Court has used at least three competing theories of the cor-
poration-the "artificial entity" theory, the "association" theory, and
the "person" theory.167 It is important to understand these theories
and how they developed because the choice of theory espoused by the
Court has consistently determined whether corporations are consid-
ered to be entitled to the constitutional right at issue. In first amend-
ment cases, the Court is returning to the artificial entity view of the
corporation. This trend has serious implications for the legal status of
corporate political speech.
ness corporations, the ACLU at least should be able to claim an exemption from
this prohibition based on MCFL, as a nonprofit corporation formed solely for
political purposes.
166. See, e.g., O'Kelley, The Constitutional Rights of Corporations Revisited.- Social
and Political Expression and the Corporation After First National Bank of Bos-
ton v. Bellotti, 67 GEo. L.J. 1347 (1979).
167. These are the names by which I refer to the three theories. Other authors use
different names. For example, Sanford Schane calls the first theory the "crea-
ture" theory and the second one the "group" theory. Schane, The Corporation is a
Person: The Language of a Legal Fiction, 61 TUL. L. REv. 563, 564 (1987). Morton
Horwitz refers to the third one as the "real entity" theory. See Horwitz, infra
note 179.
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A. Artificial Entity Theory
Which came first, the corporation or the law? The artificial entity
theory of the corporation, which had its origins in republican and im-
perial Rome and the medieval Church, would answer "the law." Ac-
cording to this theory, an overt act of the government was required to
create a legal corporation. Corporations were mere artificial beings,
originating from and dependent on the will of the civil or religious
authority.6S Although legal scholars tend to believe that the converse
was true-that corporations preexisted the law-the artificial entity
notion was politically useful to the Roman state, the Church and,
later, the British Crown, in bringing corporations under the govern-
ment's control.169
Although by 1628 the law in England was firmly settled that a cor-
poration could not be created except by an act of the Crown, American
legislatures and courts did not devise rules or policies about business
corporations until the end of the eighteenth century.170 Business cor-
porations were scarce in America before 1780; at the time the Consti-
tution was drafted, only twenty-six domestic corporations existed.171
After 1790, however, use of the corporate form expanded at an unprec-
edented rate.172 Businesses turned to incorporation for practical pur-
poses; the corporate form proved to be an efficient organizational
structure for raising and concentrating capital. 73
Along with this explosion in demand for corporate charters, Amer-
ican corporation law developed in light of American experience with
little reference to the law of England. The only distinct borrowing
from English common law with regard to corporations was the notion
that corporations were created by special state privilege to pursue a
public purpose.' 74 At the time, this theory made sense. Incorporation
was effected by special charters that were granted by state legislatures
on a one-at-a-time basis. Most incorporated organizations served some
state function, such as road building or banking, rather than general
business purposes.175
168. J. HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES, 1780-1970 17 (1970).
169. Berle, Historical Inheritance ofAmerican Corporations, 3 SOcIAL MEANING OF
LEGAL CONCEPTS 189, 192 (1950).
170. HURST, supra note 168, at 3, 7.
171. Prentice, supra note 8, at 602 n.17.
172. Whereas only 335 corporate charters were issued to American businesses in the
entire eighteenth century, 181 were granted in the four years between 1796 and
1800. In Pennsylvania alone, 2333 special charters were issued to business enter-
prises from 1790 to 1860. L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 189 (2d ed.
1985).
173. HURST, supra note 168, at 14, 19.
174. Id. at 8-9, 15.
175. For example, more than half of the special charters granted from 1780 to 1801
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Furthermore, in the early nineteenth century, incorporation was
frequently accompanied by state-granted special action franchises al-
lowing the grantee to pursue some activity denied to the general popu-
lation.176 At the time, these monopoly rights were seen as necessary
for economic development. Additionally, subsidies were often
awarded to corporations in order to encourage industrial expansion in
the new nation and to protect enterprises that might otherwise prove
too risky to undertake. 77 In return for these special favors, the state
had the right to strictly regulate corporate activity, and even required
profit sharing in some instances. 178
This state regulation and participation in corporate activity was ac-
complished not primarily, as today, through regulatory legislation but
rather through provisions of special charters.179 This led to develop-
ment of the ultra vires doctrine, which provides that a corporation
cannot act beyond the powers granted to it in the corporate charter. 8 0
Strict construction of corporate charters reinforced the notion that in-
corporation was a special privilege granted by the state's largess.181
The artificial entity theory of the corporation, then, was the domi-
nant American view of corporations in the eighteenth and early nine-
teenth centuries. The theory was used, and is still used, to limit
corporate power.
B. Association Theory
Although the special charter system, including strict construction
of charter provisions, was meant in theory to subject corporations to
meaningful state control, in practice it proved ineffective. 8 2 State leg-
islatures were deluged with requests for special charters and could not
spare the time either to draft each individually or to supervise those
were for transport enterprises, 20% were for banks or insurance companies, 10%
were for local public services, while less than 4% were for general business corpo-
rations. Id. at 17.
176. Id. at 33.
177. Hovenkamp, The Classical Corporation in American Legal Thought, 76 GEo. L.J.
1593, 1635 (1988).
178. FRIEDMAN, supra note 172, at 192.
179. Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited. The Development of Corporate Theory, 88 W. VA.
L. REV. 173, 181 (1985).
180. Id. at 186-87.
181. The most famous expression of the artificial entity theory was made by Chief
Justice Marshall in Dartmouth College v. Woodward:
A corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing
only in contemplation of law. Being the mere creature of law, it pos-
sesses only those properties which the charter of creation confers upon
it, expressly, or as incidental to its very existence. These are such as are
supposed best calculated to effect the object for which it was created.
Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 518, 636 (1819).
182. FRIEDMAN, supra note 172, at 190.
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that had been already granted 8 3 By the 1840s, state legislatures were
awarding special charters by rote, and variations in charter provisions
began to disappear. 8 4 At the same time, Jacksonian Democrats began
to call for "free incorporation" and an end to the system of special
charters and state subsidies.185 Although the Jacksonians did not ob-
ject to the corporate form itself, they viewed the special charter sys-
tem as undemocratically favoring the wealthy.18 6 In response, state
legislatures began to enact general incorporation statutes in the 1840s
and 1850s, making the ability to incorporate available to anyone and
providing standard charter provisions. 8 7 Additionally, courts began
overturning public subsidies to business corporations on the grounds
that state legislatures could tax only for a "public use" and that public
use could not be inferred solely from corporate status.'8 8
Both the demise of the special charter system and the decline of
public subsidies contradicted the notion that corporations derived
their powers from the state. General incorporation laws made incor-
poration a cheap and easy standard procedure as opposed to a state-
awarded privilege. The artificial entity theory of the corporation
could no longer justify state regulation of corporate activities. Hoping
to expand corporate rights, several members of the New York corpo-
rate bar proposed the association theory of the corporation in the
1880s.18 9
According to the association theory, corporations received their
powers not from the state, but rather from their individual sharehold-
ers. Proponents of the association theory viewed the corporation as
an association of individuals-in essence, as a partnership. 9 0 In par-
ticular, some of the association theory's supporters were concerned
with establishing a corporate right to hold property. By making the
corporation's rights simply an aggregate of its shareholders' rights, the
private nature of corporate property could be adequately protected.19'
In Santa Clara Co. v. Southern Pacific Railroad,192 the Supreme
Court affirmed in a terse, one sentence holding that corporations qual-
ify as "persons" under the fourteenth amendment. Although Santa
Clara has been cited as an example of the "person" theory of the cor-
183. Id.
184. Id. at 190-91.
.185. Hovenkamp, supra note 177, at 1634-35.
186. Id. Furthermore, a public furor arose when a large number of subsidies were
given to ventures that ultimately failed. Id. at 1635.
187. Id. at 1636.
188. Id.
189. Mark, The Personification of the Business Corporation in American Law, 54 U.
Cm. L. REv. 1441, 1457 (1987).
190. Horwitz, supra note 179, at 184.
191. Mark, supra note 189, at 1458.
192. 118 U.S. 394 (1886).
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poration, that theory did not actually appear in legal thinking for an-
other decade. According to commentators, the Supreme Court in
Santa Clara was simply applying the association theory that corporate
property was protected under the fourteenth amendment as property
of the shareholders.193
Although the association theory provided a useful justification for
protecting corporate property, it soon became obvious that the part-
nership analogy could be stretched only so far. For one thing, the as-
sociation theory threatened the doctrine of limited shareholder
liability. If shareholders were compared to partners, they logically
should have been liable for corporate debts to the full extent of their
property beyond their interest in the corporation.194 Furthermore, by
treating corporate property as the property of individual shareholders,
the association theory assumed that shareholders exercised control
over the corporation. This assumption was the theory's fatal flaw.
During the 1890s, the fundamental nature of the shareholder/corpora-
tion relationship had changed, and it could no longer be asserted that
the corporation owed its success to its shareholders.195
One change had to do with statutory rules regarding internal cor-
porate governance. Although the association theory required unani-
mous shareholder consent to corporate sales of assets and other major
corporate changes, the unanimous consent rule made corporate merg-
ers practically impossible. As a result, state legislatures in the 1890s
began changing their laws to provide for majority rule in corporate
affairs.196
It had become obvious that management wielded the real power
over corporate activities, despite the association theory's premise that
directors were subordinate to shareholders. In reality, shareholders
had little say over the operations of the business; their role was lim-
ited to that of passive investor. Individual shareholders could neither
use corporate property as their own nor dissolve the corporate entity,
and their limited liability for corporate debts resulted in limited par-
ticipation in corporate affairs.197 In order to reflect the de facto sepa-
ration between corporate ownership and control, the law developed a
third theory of corporate personality, the "person" theory.
C. Person Theory
Philosophical questions about the nature of corporations had fasci-
nated German and French political thinkers during the nineteenth
193. See, e.g., Horwitz, supra note 179, at 178; Hovenkamp, supra note 185, at 1642;
Mark, supra note 189, at 1463.
194. Horwitz, supra note 179, at 185.
195. Mark, supra note 189, at 1465.
196. Horwitz, supra note 179, at 201-02.
197. Mark, supra note 189, at 1474.
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century. Otto von Gierke, in particular, advanced the idea that groups
(and, therefore, corporations) are natural extensions of human soci-
ety.198 Corporations, Gierke said, are not just artificial creations de-
rived from law, but rather legitimate entities that exist regardless of
and separate from the law's recognition. 199 In other words, corpora-
tions are as "real" and "natural" as any person and exist indepen-
dently of their shareholders and the state. Gierke's work was
introduced to English and American scholars in 1900 by Frederic
Maitland, who agreed that corporations deserve as much judicial rec-
ognition as natural persons.200
By the end of the nineteenth century, incorporation was no longer
a state privilege and had become the primary means of American busi-
ness enterprise.201 New business needs demanded a new legal ap-
proach to corporations. While the artificial entity theory restricted
economic growth by limiting the formation of new companies, the as-
sociation theory failed to recognize the facts of corporate decision
making. In contrast, the person theory more accurately described
corporate realities, as well as legitimated corporate autonomy.2 02
Because the corporation under the person theory existed indepen-
dently of its shareholders, its membership could change without de-
stroying the corporation.203 Furthermore, shareholder unanimity
would no longer be required for corporate mergers.204 Because a cor-
poration could hold property and incur debts in its own name, it fol-
lowed that shareholders would assume only limited responsibility for
the company's liabilities. Because the corporation was viewed as a
person, it had the ability to delegate authority to its officers and direc-
tors, who served as corporate agents.2 05 And because corporate of-
ficers and directors then became the appropriate parties to assert the
corporation's rights, the shareholders lacked standing to participate in
litigation involving the corporation.206
Nineteenth century decisions of the Supreme Court mirrored the
complexity of the corporate personality question by reflecting all
three competing theories of the corporation. In general, the artificial
198. Maitland, Introduction to 0. GiERKE, POLTICAL THEORIES OF THE MIDDLE AGE at
xvini-xlifi (1987).
199. k at xxv-xxvi.
200. Horwitz, supra note 179, at 179.
201. Id. at 180.
202. Mark, supra note 189, at 1470.
203. Schane, supra note 167, at 568.
204. Horwitz, supra note 179, at 202.
205. Schane, supra note 167, at 568.
206. This final rationale for the eventual adoption of the person theory by the federal
courts is emphasized by Hovenkamp, who stated, "[t]he thought that every share-
holder could challenge a rate regulation as confiscatory would make any federal
judge shudder." Hovenkamp, supra note 177, at 1643.
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entity theory was used to deny corporate rights, and the person theory
was used to grant them.207
According to Morton Horwitz,208 the first Supreme Court decision
to fully embrace the person theory of the corporation was the 1905
case of Hale v. Henke, 20 9 in which the Court granted corporations
fourth amendment protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures. The Court remained hesitant to adopt wholeheartedly a new
concept of the corporation, as evidenced by its refusal in the same case
to grant corporations the fifth amendment privilege against self-in-
crimination. By the early twentieth century, however, the person the-
ory of the corporation had prevailed in American jurisprudence. 210
D. Corporate Speech and Theories of Corporate Personality
These theories of corporate personality relate to the question of
corporate rights to political speech under the first amendment in
three significant ways. First, the Court has used the different theories
of corporate personality to justify seemingly disparate results regard-
ing corporate constitutional rights. For example, by the time the
Supreme Court granted first amendment protection to corporate polit-
ical speech in Bellotti, it had already considered the first amendment
rights of unincorporated associations, newspaper corporations, and la-
bor unions. In these cases, the Court used the artificial entity theory
to deny corporate first amendment rights and the person theory to
grant them.2 11
Second, it is important to understand that despite the criticism of
Bellotti that corporations are not persons and should not be treated as
such for purposes of the first amendment, Bellotti was not decided
207. Dewey, The Historical Background of Corporate Legal Personality, 35 YALE L.J.
655, 669-70 (1926); Mayer, supra note 11, at 581.
208. Horwitz, supra note 179, at 182.
209. 201 U.S. 43 (1905).
210. Mayer, supra note 11, at 581. See also Southern R.R. v. Greene, 216 U.S. 400
(1910).
211. For example, in Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936), the Court
used the person theory to grant a newspaper corporation a first amendment right
to sell advertisements without interference by the state. The Court relied on
precedents holding that corporations are "persons" under the fourteenth amend-
ment and held that the liberty clause of that amendment prohibited states from
interfering with the newspaper corporation's first amendment rights. Id. at 244.
The Court's reasoning in Grosjean, however, directly conflicted with its ear-
lier holding in Northwestern Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Riggs, 203 U.S. 243 (1906),
where the Court had specifically denied that a corporation was entitled to liberty
rights under the fourteenth amendment, saying that the due process clause of
that amendment protected only the property interests of corporations. Id. at 255.
In 1939, three years after Grosjean, the Court relied on Riggs to deny first
amendment rights to several unincorporated labor unions and one nonmedia cor-
poration (the ACLU) in Hague v. Committee for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
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pursuant to the person theory of the corporation. Justice Powell, in
his majority opinion, emphasized that the Court was not holding that
corporations have first amendment rights, but rather that listeners
have first amendment rights to hear political ideas.21 2 In fact, Carl
Mayer has persuasively argued that after 1960, the Court stopped rely-
ing on theories of corporate personality and instead took a pragmatic
approach to intangible corporate rights that Mayer calls "constitu-
tional operationalism". 213
Under that pragmatic view, instead of looking to the characteristics
of the corporation to determine whether it should be accorded a par-
ticular constitutional right, Mayer believes that the Court looks to the
underlying purpose of the amendment in question. For example, in
Bellotti, Mayer contends that the Court saw the fundamental purpose
of the first amendment to be the development of a free market of
ideas. To serve that paramount purpose, the Court had to grant first
amendment rights to corporations. 2 14
Finally, and most critically, an understanding of the theories of
corporate personality is necessary to grasp the implications of Justice
Rehnquist's resurrection of the artificial entity theory in recent Court
decisions. In his Bellotti dissent, Justice Rehnquist argued that corpo-
rations are no more than artificial creations of the state, entitled only
to property rights under the fourteenth amendment. Therefore, he
said, corporations have no liberty right of political expression.2 15
Again in his Central Hudson dissent, Rehnquist asserted that corpora-
tions, which exist only through state law, could be subjected to strin-
gent state control.2 16 In a major shift away from the Bellotti rationale,
the Supreme Court has adopted Justice Rehnquist's characterization
of corporations as creatures of the state in the NRWC,217 NCPAC,218
and Austin 219 decisions.
In MCFL, the Court specifically singled out business corporations
as the recipients of the bulk of these state law advantages. 220 By em-
212. See supra text accompanying note 55.
213. Mayer, supra note 11, at 650.
214. Id. at 633-34. The language of Bellotti supports Mayer's position. For example,
Justice Powell stated that "[w]hether or not a particular guarantee is 'purely per-
sonal' or is unavailable to corporations for some other reason depends on the na-
ture, history and purpose of the particular constitutional provision." Boston v.
Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 778 n.14 (1978).
215. Id. at 824-26 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
216. Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm., 447 U.S. 530, 583-85 (1980) (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting).
217. Federal Election Comm'n v. National Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 209
(1982).
218. Federal Election Comm'n v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470
U.S. 480, 495 (1985).
219. Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 110 S. Ct. 1391, 1397 (1990).
220. In a footnote to that decision, Justice Brennan wrote that "[w]hile business corpo-
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ploying the rhetoric of the artificial entity theory, the Court has laid
the groundwork from which Bellotti could be overruled and first
amendment protection could be denied to the political speech of busi-
ness corporations, while still granting protected status for the speech
of other powerful organizations such as media and ideological corpora-
tions, and unincorporated associations.
VI. DOES CORPORATE POLITICAL SPEECH VIOLATE THE
RIGHTS OF DISSENTING SHAREHOLDERS?
A second criticism of Bellotti claims that allowing corporations to
engage in political speech necessarily violates the first amendment
rights of corporate shareholders who disagree with the positions taken
by corporate management.22 1 Under this view, corporate speech does
no more than amplify management's position with funds actually be-
longing to shareholders and, therefore, is undeserving of first amend-
ment protection.222 Managers and shareholders of corporations, it is
claimed, have adequate ability to advocate political views in their indi-
vidual capacities with their individual funds.223
Justice White raised this argument in his dissenting opinion in Bel-
lotti, where he concluded that the state should be allowed to prohibit
officers and directors from using corporate funds to promote ideas
"necessarily representing their own personal views about political and
social questions."224 By comparing shareholders with union members,
Justice White relied on a line of Supreme Court cases holding that the
state can require labor unions to procure the express consent of their
membership before using union dues for political purposes.225
On the other side of the argument, commentators who agree with
the Bellotti result point out that dissenting shareholders have more
viable remedies to protest ideologically repugnant speech than do
union members. Shareholders can sell their shares or, at least theo-
rations may not represent the only organizations that pose this danger" of distor-
tion of the political process, "they are by far the most prominent example of
entities that enjoy legal advantages enhancing their ability to accumulate
wealth." Federal Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479
U.S. 238, 258 n.11 (1986).
221. See, eg., Brudney, Business Corporations and Shareholders' Rights Under the
First Amendment, 91 YALE L.J. 235 (1981).
222. Id. at 237-38.
223. See Note, The Corporation and the Constitution: Economic Due Process and Cor-
porate Speech, 90 YALE L.J. 1833 (1981)(authored by David Keto).
224. First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 802-03 (1978).
225. International Ass'n Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961); Abood v. Detroit
Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209 (1977). In Abood, the Court held that although a
union is free to spend funds for political purposes, such expenditures must be
paid by members who do not object to those ideas. Id. at 235-36.
In 1990, the court further extended the Abood rationale to a state bar associa-
tion in Keller v. State Bar of California, 110 S. Ct. 2228 (1990).
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retically, vote out the current directors, whereas union members can-
not resign their union membership without suffering a loss of
employment. This presupposes, of course, that shareholders are both
aware and concerned about corporate political expenditures.22 6
Another argument against the need to protect the speech rights of
dissenting shareholders focuses on the realities of corporate structure.
The procedures of corporate governance forbid investors from dictat-
ing to management about most corporate decisions, outside of their
ability to vote their shares. But why should communication by man-
agement be viewed as more repugnant than other types of decision-
making by management? Dissenting shareholders might just as well
object to certain corporate business practices, or to the content of cor-
porate advertising campaigns. Taken to its logical extreme, the pro-
tection of minority shareholders would require a total redesign of the
corporation.
The majority in Bellotti did not specifically reject the protection of
minority shareholders as a permissible state objective; rather, it held
that the Massachusetts statute in question failed to do so by reason of
being both over- and underinclusive.227 However, the protection of
minority shareholders reemerged as a legitimate state interest suffi-
cient to justify government regulation of corporate political expres-
sion in the cases of NRWC, MCFL, and Austin. For example, Justice
Brennan's opinion in MCFL specifically compared business corpora-
tions to unions, stating that because dissenting stockholders and union
members "depend on the organization for income or for a job, it is not
enough to tell them that any unhappiness with the use of their money
can be redressed simply by leaving the corporation or the union."
228
And in the Austin decision, despite Justice Scalia's forceful pro-
test,229 the Supreme Court found that members of the Chamber were
analogous to corporate shareholders, who might be disinclined to
forgo a profitable investment in a business corporation just because
226. Although the "Wall Street Rule" enables investors to "vote with their feet," some
believe it has little ultimate effect on management's activities. Schwartz, Corpo-
rate Governance, in CORPORATIONS AND THEIR CRnIcs 225 (T. Bradshaw and D.
Vogel eds. 1981). However, at least one analyst has concluded that management
pursues organizational goals rather than personal ones when conducting corpo-
rate political activities. Prentice, supra note 8, at 633-35.
227. First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 793-94 (1978). See supra text accompa-
nying notes 67-68.
228. Federal Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238,
260 (1986).
229. Scalia described it as "fanciful" to suggest that the Michigan statute at issue
"makes any significant contribution towards insulating the exclusively profit-mo-
tivated shareholder from the rude world of politics and ideology." Austin v.
Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 110 S. Ct. 1391, 1412 (1990)(Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
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they disagreed with the corporation's political speech.230 In effect, the
Court said that shareholders should not be forced to choose between
financing speech with which they disagree or relinquishing a profita-
ble investment.
Advocates of shareholder rights hailed the Austin decision as em-
powering shareholders to influence management on decisions affect-
ing their vital interests.23 1 However, the existence and importance of
institutional investors should not be overlooked in evaluating the
Court's newfound concern regarding shareholder protection. It has
been estimated that institutional investors23 2 currently hold approxi-
mately sixty percent of all common stock in American corporations,
and that percentage is growing.23 3 These institutional investors are
taking a stronger role in corporate affairs by actively submitting
shareholder proposals dealing with social and political issues.23 4
If the majority of American stock is held by institutions, it makes
little sense to talk about protecting the free speech rights of individual
shareholders through prohibitions on corporate political speech. Title
to securities in public pension funds, for example, is generally held by
a single trustee who determines how to vote the shares based on ad-
vice from the board of directors of the fund.235 The real owners of the
securities, the beneficiaries of the pension plans, do not make the deci-
sions on how to vote the shares in the pension's portfolio. Therefore,
in many cases, individual shareholders are not in a position to vote
their shares at all. Although a complete ban on corporate political
spending would certainly protect individual shareholders from endors-
ing political expression with which they disagree, it would also stifle
corporate expression that individual shareholders may support or that
might better serve their economic interests.236
Rather than giving shareholders veto power over corporate polit-
ical spending, a more logical way to protect shareholder interests
might be to enact legislation requiring that shareholders be informed
230. IL at 1399.
231. Sethi, Restrained Corporate Political Speech, N.Y. Times, Oct. 21, 1990 § 3, at 13,
col. 2.
232. For example, insurance companies, banks, and pension funds.
233. Cain, Corporate Participation, Nat'l L.J., Sept. 10, 1990, at 13, col. 1.
234. During the 1985-86 proxy year, institutions presented 33 shareholder proposals to
public companies under SEC rules; by 1988-89, the total number of institutional
proposals had risen to 124. Id.
235. Id. at 14.
236. Any law restricting corporate political speech on the grounds of minority share-
holder protection would have to prohibit all corporate political activity, including
lobbying, in order to escape the charge of underinclusivity. Although corporate
lobbying is subject to regulation under the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act, 2
U.S.C. §§ 261-270 (1988), such lobbying was recognized as legitimate by the
Supreme Court in Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight,
365 U.S. 127 (1961). See Prentice, supra note 8, at 629-30.
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of corporate political expenditures. Shareholders cannot exercise
their existing rights under corporate procedures if they are not aware
of the corporation's political activities. However, shareholders are
generally not informed of corporate political advocacy and may find
corporations unwilling to provide this information when they ask.237
Moreover, it is difficult for shareholders to obtain such information
from state election commissions without having some reason to be-
lieve their company would have contributed to a certain campaign. 238
In response to the Belloti decision, the Securities and Exchange
Commission in 1980 issued a staff report recommending that the SEC
require disclosure of corporate ballot issue expenditures in proxy
materials or the annual report to shareholders.239 The recommenda-
tion took cognizance of the fact that dissenting shareholders can exer-
cise their rights under corporate law only if they are informed of
corporate political expenditures. After learning the size of the contri-
butions being made, shareholders might question how the issue relates
to the company's business.240
Would such disclosure be effective? Without question, many inves-
tors simply do not care about the political activities of the corporations
in which they hold stock. Furthermore, for the sixty percent of the
American market controlled by institutional investors, individual
fund participants would not even receive the disclosures. However, in
recent years, increasing public apprehension about the social and envi-
ronmental consequences of corporate activities has resulted in a class
of investors who shun corporations they perceive as socially irrespon-
sible.241 If the SEC mandates that information about corporations'
political expenditures be made available through corporate annual re-
237. In 1978 and 1979, the Council on Economic Priorities queried 13 corporations
about whether they told their shareholders about their extensive involvement in
ballot issue campaigns. The Council also examined the companies' annual re-
ports for those two years. Ten of the 13 corporations refused to respond to the
questionnaire, and only one responded fully. The respondent stated that the
company would inform shareholders of contributions to ballot questions upon re-
quest; however, it had never received such a request. Eight of the companies
made no mention of their contributions in their annual reports, and even those
that did neglected to specify the extent of their involvement. LYDENBERG, supra
note 15, at 35-37.
238. Id. at 35.
239. DIVISION OF CORPORATION FINANCE, SEcuRTIS AND EXCHANGE ComInSSION,
96TH CONG., 2D SEss. STAFF REPORT ON CORPORATE AccOUNTABILTY B151, 196
(Comm. Print 1980).
240. LYDENBERG, supra note 15, at 34.
241. Spicer, Investors, Corporate Social Performance and Information Disclosure: An
Empirical Study, 53 Accr. REV. 94, 95-96 (1978). Although the trend of social
investing originated in the 1960s, it has continued to grow. Socially oriented
money market and mutual funds, as well as investment advisors specializing in
social accounts, flourished during the 1980s. See S. LYDENBERG, RATING
AmERIcA's CORPORATE CONSCIENCE (1986).
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ports, it would appear that at least some of these concerned investors
would be willing to bear the burden of locating and digesting such
information.
Although the SEC has taken no public action on the disclosure rec-
ommendation, an SEC requirement for corporate disclosure to
shareholders on contributions to ballot question campaigns could pro-
vide a way to protect shareholder rights without denying political ex-
pression to corporations. A disclosure requirement would keep
investors and other special interest groups informed of corporate
political expenditures and would provide a record for potential share-
holders to examine before making investment decisions. Although a
corporation's past political spending would not provide any guarantee
regarding future spending, disclosure would ensure that shareholders
could at least retroactively defend their interests.2 43 Furthermore,
such a requirement would protect shareholder rights by requiring
more speech, rather than by prohibiting it.
VII. DOES CORPORATE SPENDING RESULT IN UNDUE
INFLUENCE IN BALLOT ISSUE CAMPAIGNS?
Many critics claim that the Bellotti decision has resulted in corpo-
rate dominance of the ballot issue process.2 " According to this view,
unlimited corporate spending squeezes out the voices of those individ-
uals and groups that are less well financed. This power of the purse
may distort and undermine the process of direct democracy, disillu-
sioning voters who become less likely to participate in government.2 45
In Bellotti, the Supreme Court admitted that corporate spending
might influence referendum votes, but said that Massachusetts had
failed to show any evidence or legislative findings indicating that cor-
porate advocacy in a referendum would exert an undue influence on
the election outcome. 246 The Court's assumption that corporate finan-
cial dominance has no significant effect on the political process has
242. See Shockley, Direct Democracy, Campaign Finance, and the Courts: Can Cor-
ruption, Undue Influence, and Declining Voter Confidence Be Found?, 39 U.
MLAas L. REv. 377, 420 (1985).
243. See Note, Corporate Speech on Political Issues: The First Amendment in Conflict
with Democratic Ideals?, 1985 U. ILL. L. REV. 445, 465 (1985).
244. See, e.g., Hart & Shore, Corporate Spending on State and Local Referendums:
First National Bank v. Bellotti, 29 CASE W. RES. 808 (1979); Mastro, Costlow &
Sanchez, supra note 29, at 353; Patton & Bartlett, Corporate "Persons" and Free-
dom ofSpeeck The Political Impact of Legal Mythology, 1981 Wis. L. REV. 494,
502; Schneider, Free Speech and Corporate Freedom: A Comment on First Na-
tional Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 1227, 1228 (1986); Wright,
supra note 5, at 612-13.
245. See Shocldey, supra note 242, at 399-400.
246. First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 789-90 (1978). See supra note 62 and
accompanying text.
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been castigated as naive and has led commentators to speculate that if
a direct, causal connection were shown between corporate spending
and election results, the Court would be willing to reconsider the Bel-
lotti decision 247. Since 1978 a number of studies have been conducted
to determine whether corporate spending disproportionately affects
the outcome in referendum campaigns.
A study of three 1976 Colorado ballot issues undertaken by the Me-
dia Access Project (MAP) found a strong correlation between voter
behavior and overwhelming corporate spending opposing passage,
which included corporate domination of television and radio advertis-
ing.24 8 All three initiatives were headed for victory according to pree-
lection polls but ended up being defeated. Citizens groups supporting
passage did not have the financial wherewithal to compete with corpo-
rate interests and were, ultimately, unsuccessful.2 49
Based on their findings, MAP investigators acknowledged that fac-
tors other than spending play a part in determining ballot election out-
comes. These include media editorial positions, campaign
organizational strength, initial popularity of the measure, complexity
of the measure, perceived cost of the measure to taxpayers, and the
position taken by opinion leaders.250 However, the study concluded
that the corporate opponents used financial superiority to wage media
campaigns, thereby reaching more voters than the other side.251
In 1980, the Council on Economic Priorities (CEP) studied the im-
pact of corporate spending on ballot issue campaigns held in twelve
states.252 The study determined that although financial superiority
does not guarantee victory in ballot issue campaigns, it does provide an
apparent advantage. In the fourteen campaigns where corporate
spending dominated, the CEP reported that business interests were
successful eleven times (seventy-eight percent). 253
The study also learned that both state and local ballot issue cam-
247. CRONIN, supra note 15, at 107; Easley, supra note 30, at 724; Hart & Shore, supra
note 244, at 814.
248. Mastro, Costlow & Sanchez, supra note 29, at 318-19. It should be noted that
MAP did not undertake the research with an objective point of view. MAP de-
scribed itself as a nonprofit, nonpartisan public interest law firm that represented
citizen groups and individuals concerned about "insuring that information in soci-
ety flows freely without undue influence by corporate power." Id. at 316 n.2.
249. Id. at 317.
250. Id. at 327 n.46.
251. Id. at 326-27.
252. California, Colorado, Florida, Maine, Massachusetts, Missouri, Montana, North
Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, South Dakota, and Washington. LYDENBERG, supra note
15, at 39-41.
253. Id. at 2. One of the three campaigns where the financial underdog won a ballot
proposition involved a Montana intiative to ban nuclear waste disposal in the
state. In that campaign, the antinuclear side was outspent 58-to-1, yet still
emerged victorious. Id. at 40.
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paigns in which corporations participated were much costlier than
those that did not involve corporate interests.254 Additionally, the
business-backed side of ballot issue campaigns frequently tried to hide
the presence of corporate funds in order to create an illusion of public
support.255 For example, "citizens" committees that supported nu-
clear development in Maine, Missouri, and Oregon were actually
funded with business dollars.256
Finally, although the CEP noted that unions and other special in-
terest groups occasionally dominate ballot issue spending, it concluded
that corporations are generally more adept in raising money to finance
ballot campaigns.257 Unions, the only other group having access to
funds on a scale comparable to corporations, could not give huge, sin-
gle contributions or mobilize support on a national scale the way cor-
porations did.258
In another study, Daniel Lowenstein analyzed twenty-five Califor-
nia ballot propositions in which significant one-sided spending oc-
curred between 1968 and 1980.259 His aggregate data showed that one-
sided spending in ballot issue campaigns is much more effective when
it is used in opposition to a ballot proposal than in support of a mea-
sure-even when the proposal is a popular one.260 Lowenstein ex-
plained this result, which he called the "spending effectiveness
phenomenon," by showing that the campaign messages distributed by
the big spenders characteristically used deceit, distortion, and appeals
to superficial or irrelevant topics.26 1
254. Id. at 1, 5. This was attributed, at least in part, to the large amounts expended by
individual corporations. For example, the Union Electric Company paid $1.15
million to oppose a Missouri initiative that would have delayed the opening of the
state's first nuclear power plant, and a tobacco company spent $1.14 million to
fight two local antismoking initiatives in California and Florida. Id. at 3-4.
255. Id. at 4.
256. Id. The committee against nuclear prohibition in Missouri, which referred to it-
self as a citizens committee with more than 25,000 individual members, received
only $7373 of its $1,790,857 in contributions from unincorporated sources. Id. at 4-
5.
257. Id. at 14.
258. Id. at 14-15.
259. Lowenstein, Campaign Spending and Ballot Propositions: Recent Experience,
Public Choice Theory and the First Amendment. 29 UCLA L. REV. 505 (1982). He
defined "one-sided" as spending that exceeded $250,000 and that was at least
twice as high as expenditures on the other side of the issue. Id. at 511. He found
spending disparities of as much as 37-to-1 in the ballot measures he studied. Id. at
520.
260. In the study, big spending was shown to be successful 16 times (64%) and unsuc-
cessful nine times (36%). However, of the 10 propositions that were opposed by
big spending, nine were defeated (90%). Of the 15 propositions supported by big
spending, seven were successful (46%) and eight (54%) were defeated. Id. at 518.
261. Id. at 517. Lowenstein argued that these techniques were successful because it is
easier to change the voters' perceptions of the consequences of a measure than it
is to change their basic attitudes about the issues involved. Id. at 569-70.
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Another analysis of California ballot initiatives confirmed Lowen-
stein's findings that although proponents cannot buy passage of an ini-
tiative by outspending the opposition, those who are opposed to a
measure can "virtually guarantee" its defeat by engaging in dispropor-
tionate spending.262 David Magleby's California research project,
which covered the years 1954 to 1982, revealed that in cases where ini-
tiative opponents were responsible for at least two-thirds or more of
the total campaign expenditures, they defeated their opponents
eighty-seven percent of the time.263 Magleby referred to groups such
as organized labor, public utilities, tobacco companies, and glass and
aluminum bottlers as big spenders in the initiatives studied, and he
speculated that their high-spending strategies were probably
prudent.264
A 1985 article by John Shockley cited two additional studies that
support Lowenstein's spending effectiveness phenomenon. The first,
a survey of 1980 and 1981 initiatives by analysts for the Initiative News
Report, found that although one-sided spending had a success rate of
sixty percent when supporting a measure, it won eighty-one percent of
the time when it was on the opposing side.265 The second, a group of
studies by Steven Lydenberg on ballot issues held in 1978 and 1979, as
well as the 1980 CEP research discussed above, concluded that when
the "corporate" side spent considerably more money to defeat ballot
proposals than the proponents spent in favor of them, the corporate
side won eighty-one percent of the time.266 Because the results of
preelection polls showed many of these measures ahead in popularity
before the opposition spending began, Shockley concluded that big
spending had effectively determined the outcome of the election.26 7
Finally, in a comparative study of major ballot questions in four
states268s from 1976 to 1982, Betty Zisk concluded that "[t]he single
most important finding in this study concerns the crucial role of
262. MAGLEBY, supra note 13, at 147.
263. Id.
264. "[O]ne loss could spawn a host of other ballot measures and give energy to legisla-
tive efforts at the local, state and even national levels." Id. at 193.
265. Shocldey, supra note 242, at 394 n.67. However, where initiatives faced minimal
spending, 71% of them were approved, and in those instances where roughly
equal spending occurred, 60% were approved. Id.
266. Id. at 394.
267. Id. at 395. Although Shockley agreed that money is certainly significant in deter-
mining ballot proposition outcomes, he listed five other factors that are also influ-
ential: (1) how effectiely available money is spent; (2) the depth and breadth of
coalitions for and against particular ballot measures; (3) the complexity of the
issues involved; (4) the ballot wording of initiative proposals; and (5) the place-
ment of ballot issues on the ballot. However, Shockley emphasized that these
nonfinancial determinants do not nullify the effect of disproportionate spending
on ballot election outcomes. Id. at 397-98.
268. Massachusetts, Michigan, Oregon, and California. ZIsK, supra note 15, at 9.
1991]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
money in campaigns on ballot questions."2 69 In fifty-six of the sev-
enty-two campaigns she studied, or seventy-eight percent of the time,
the high-spending side won the election. She also corroborated Low-
enstein's finding that one-sided spending was more effective in opposi-
tion than in support of ballot measures. 270
Although Zisk agreed with Lowenstein that deceptive campaign
rhetoric characterized one-sided spending campaigns, she found that
two-sided high spending made the problem worse. When both sides
had money to spend, her data indicated that both sides relied on slo-
gans and misrepresentation.2 71 She concluded that high-spending
campaigns are not effective in actually informing voters about the is-
sues and that "two heavy spenders may simply cause twice the confu-
sion of one rather than one forcing the other to confront the real
issues."272
Corporations were not the only high spenders identified in Zisk's
research. Others included: (1) traditional interest groups such as la-
bor unions, educators, chambers of commerce, and business corpora-
tions; (2) public interest groups such as environmentalists; and (3) ad
hoc groupings such as single-issue citizens groups.273 In the fifty is-
sues studied between 1976 and 1980, she found corporate spending in-
volved in twenty-six of them (fifty-two percent). In just over one-
third of those instances, corporate support was divided and different
sets of business interests opposed each other on the same issue.274
Wealth, of course, cannot always purchase the defeat of every bal-
lot proposal. Many studies include one or two examples of ballot pro-
positions that passed despite high opposition spending.275 However,
very few scholars have argued that money has little or no effect on
ballot measure campaigns, and of those that do, many rely on aggre-
gate data. It has been argued that these writers reached erroneous
conclusions by failing to distinguish between those ballot proposals
supported and those opposed by high spending.27 6
Based on these various studies, it appears undeniable that dispro-
portionate spending exerts an undue influence in ballot issue cam-
269. Id. at 245.
270. Id. at 116.
271. "Scapegoating and deception (the California water plan), fear arousal (California
gun control), diversionary tactics (Oregon's self-service gas), and oversimplifica-
tion ('D is dumb' in Michigan) abound in two-sided campaigns as well as in those
that are lopsided." Id. at 231.
272. Id. at 154-55.
273. Id. at 240-42.
274. Id. at 96.
275. See, e.g., Easley, supra note 30, at 690; MAGLEBY, supra note 13 at 147.
276. Lowenstein, supra note 259, at 511-12. For example, in a 1979 article assessing a
national initiative proposal, Ronald Allen maintained that one-sided spending in
ballot propositions is not significant. However, in a footnote, he recognized
Shockley's research and allowed that one-sided opposition spending might be ir-
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paigns. At least five researchers have concluded that high spending in
ballot proposition campaigns can determine election outcomes. And
several of these investigators have corroborated Lowenstein's finding
that one-sided spending is more effective in opposition to ballot meas-
ures than in support of them. However, Zisk's data point out that the
real culprit in deceptive referendum and initiative contests may be ex-
cessive spending in general. Finally, it is important to note that corpo-
rations are not the only interest group participants in ballot elections,
nor are corporations always united in their support of an issue.
Although corporations may be the most frequent source of dispropor-
tionate spending in ballot measures, they are not the only source.
VIII. EVALUATION AND CONCLUSION
In Bellotti, the Court rejected Massachusetts' proffered state inter-
est in eliminating undue corporate influence on referendum questions
because the state failed to show any evidence that such undue influ-
ence existed. Since that decision, a number of studies, including those
discussed above, have shown the dominating impact of high spending
in ballot measure campaigns.
Additionally, the Court in Austin has redefined "corruption" to no
longer mean the danger of quid pro quo exchanges of political favors
for money, but rather the distorting influence of large political ex-
penditures made by corporations that do not reflect actual public sup-
port for the ideas advanced. The Austin Court also accepted the
protection of minority shareholders as a compelling state interest, ap-
proved expenditure restrictions in candidate campaigns, and used lan-
guage presaging a return to the artificial entity theory of the
corporation. As a result, state legislatures may be enticed to enact or
reenact legislation prohibiting or limiting corporate expenditures in
ballot issue campaigns, and the Court eventually will have to deter-
mine if denying first amendment protection to corporate political
speech is the best way to deal with unequal distribution of wealth.
As with many other first amendment questions, the issue of corpo-
rate political speech presents conflicting values. In determining
whether Bellotti should be overruled, the Court must weigh the bene-
fits of corporate political speech to the marketplace of ideas against
the detriments of potential corporate domination to the political pro-
cess. On one hand, the first amendment mandates diversity of expres-
sion, which would ideally include corporate expression; on the other,
portant in determining ballot contest outcomes. Allen, The National Initiative
Proposa" A Preliminary Analysis, 58 NEB. L. REV. 965, 1035 n.347 (1979).
In a 1981 article, Robert Prentice raised several thoughtful arguments for his
conclusion that corporate interests do not dominate in referendum contests. How-
ever, he cited only two examples of a referendum where high-spending corporate
opposition was unsuccessful. Prentice, surra note 8, at 641 n.251.
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high-spending corporate domination of the ballot issue process threat-
ens the first amendment rights of speakers with less wherewithal to
be heard. No matter how the conflict is resolved, first amendment
values must be compromised to some degree. It must be determined
whether denying first amendment rights to corporations would solve
the problems associated with ballot issue domination by high-spend-
ers, or would create additional concerns. Furthermore, any solution to
the problem of corporate domination in ballot issue contests must not
cut so broadly as to deny more speech rights than necessary to address
the issue at hand.
To properly evaluate proposed reforms to eliminate the problem of
corporate domination of ballot propositions, these conflicting interests
must be taken into account. Reform suggestions range from the ex-
treme to the utilitarian, from excluding corporations entirely from the
protection of the first amendment to relying solely on financial disclo-
sure laws to publicize unequal spending levels. This Article will con-
sider eight proposed solutions to the corporate domination problem
and will conclude that imposing reasonable spending limits on all indi-
viduals and groups is the only effective way to remove the dangers of
high and disproportionate spending.
A. Proposed Solutions
1. Deny all free speech rights to corporations.
Several commentators have argued that business corporations
should not be granted first amendment rights at all.277 This approach
would attempt to solve the problem of corporate dominance in ballot
issue campaigns by denying the existence of competing interests. By
exposing corporate political speech to unlimited state regulation, these
solutions presume that corporate speech has no intrinsic merit and
adds nothing to the public policy process.
Would the public interest really be served by prohibiting corporate
political expression? The Bellotti decision rests on the public's right to
receive information. If we are a government by the people, the people
must have access to information in order to make informed choices.
By ensuring expression of diverse points of view, the first amendment
allows democratic processes to operate effectively. Corporations are a
major force in our society and can be a valuable source of information
and expertise with regard to important public policy issues. Legal
scholars such as Alexander Meiklejohn have argued that the first
amendment does not preclude government regulation of speech when
277. See, e.g., Mayer, supra note 11, at 660-61 (proposing a constitutional amendment
excluding corporations from the Bill of Rights); Note, supra note 223, at 1860
(advocating that the Court overrule Santa Clara). A return to the artificial entity
theory of the corporation would accomplish the same thing.
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the regulation is needed to keep the marketplace of ideas from being
controlled by a single speaker.278 However, any solution to the prob-
lem of corporate dominance in the initiative/referendum process that
completely denies first amendment rights to corporate political speech
would severely limit diversity of expression and would ultimately fail
to serve the public interest.
A repudiation of all first amendment rights to corporations would
cut far too broadly and result in other consequences that are hard to
justify. For example, if corporations had no first amendment rights,
libel plaintiffs would be allowed to recover against corporate publica-
tions without having to prove either negligence or actual malice. In
Gertz v. Robert WeZch, Inc.,279 the Supreme Court held that the first
amendment requires that libel plaintiffs prove some level of fault, at
least against defendants who disseminate information about matters
of public concern to a mass audience. Without first amendment pro-
tection, corporate newsletters like the one at issue in Pacific Gas &
E'ectric, which reached more than three million consumers,280 would
be subject to a less strict standard for libel liability. No such distinc-
tion should be made without a finding that corporate publications
make no worthy contributions to social dialogue.
More importantly, not only would such a solution do away with
corporate political speech, it would remove constitutional protection
for commercial speech as well. Should abortions again become illegal
in Virginia, out-of-state, incorporated abortion clinics could then be
prohibited from advertising in Virginia newspapers. This result was
specifically rejected by the Supreme Court in Bigelow v. Virginia,28 '
on the grounds that Virginia citizens had a first amendment right to
know that abortions could be obtained in other states. Denying first
amendment rights to corporations ultimately impinges on listeners'
first amendment rights to be exposed to diverse information from dif-
ferent sources, including incorporated ones.
Additionally, removing corporate speech from the protections of
the first amendment would require a constitutional definition of the
press in order to exempt media corporations, who presumably would
still be free to speak. Despite Justice Stewart's contention that the
press clause of the first amendment gives explicit protection to the
institutional press, 28 2 the Court has avoided fashioning such a
definition.28 3
278. A. MEILEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND rrs RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 1-27
(1948).
279. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
280. 475 U.S. 1, 5, reh'g denied, 475 U.S. 1133 (1986).
281. 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
282. Stewart, "Or of the Press", 26 HAsTiNGs L.J. 631, 633 (1975).
283. For example, in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980), the
Court held that the press could not be excluded from criminal trials because the
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Undeniably, Court decisions have contained language recognizing
that the press has a special function in the American system of democ-
racy.28 4 In addition, plenty of statutory definitions of the press exist,
should the Court be willing to adopt one. For example, the Privacy
Protection Act of 1980285 makes it unlawful for a state official, without
probable cause, to search or seize "any work product materials pos-
sessed by a person reasonably believed to have a purpose to dissemi-
nate to the public a newspaper, book, broadcast, or other similar form
of public communication." 28 6 However, this broad definition makes
no attempt to identify the "institutional press," relying instead on the
speaker's motivation to engage in public expression. Corporate public
relations departments that produce newsletters similar to the one at
issue in Pacific Gas & Electric would certainly not be excluded from
first amendment protection based on this type of definition.
More specific definitions of the press have been formulated in vari-
ous state shield laws that give varying degrees of protection to journal-
ists who seek to keep their sources confidential. The definitions of
who is covered by the statutes vary from state to state. Some states
focus on regular employees of the traditional news media, granting
protection, for example, to newspaper writers but not free-lancers or
nonfiction writers.28 7 Others consider only the intent to communicate
information to the public in determining who is covered by the statute.
Those state shield statutes with narrow definitions of the press, how-
ever, have resulted in application problems and have often been
amended to expand their coverage. 28 8 If the Court were to adopt or
uphold such a definition, it would have to evaluate the consequences
such a definition might have in other first amendment areas, such as
in determining the scope of a journalist's privilege or right of access
under the first amendment. Furthermore, a narrow definition of the
press would be likely to include wealthy media corporations and ex-
clude less powerful ones-a result that would be at odds with the no-
tion of reducing corporate domination of political speech.
public has a first amendment right to observe the judicial process. And in
Houchins v. KQED, 438 U.S. 1 (1978), the Court decided that the first amendment
does not give the press any greater right of access than belongs to any citizen to
tour prison facilities.
284. In Austin, for example, the Court said that a meaningful enough difference exists
between media and other corporations to justify excluding the media from polit-
ical expenditure limits, even if "the press' unique societal role may not entitle the
press to greater protection under the Constitution." Austin v. Michigan Chamber
of Commerce, 110 S. Ct. 1391, 1402 (1990).
285. 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa (1988).
286. Id. at § 2000aa(a).
287. Abrams, The Press Is Different- Reflections on Justice Stewart and the Autono-
mous Press, 7 HoFsTRA L. REV. 563, 582-83 (1979).
288. D. GILLMOR, J. BARRON, T. SIMON & H. TERRY, MASS COMMUNICATIONS LAW 369-
71 (5th ed. 1990)[hereinafter MASS COMMUNICATIONS].
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Some commentators have argued that any prohibition on corporate
first amendment rights should exclude corporations formed for polit-
ical or ideological purposes.28 9 This would allow the Court to continue
to recognize the first amendment rights of nonprofit, nonbusiness
political corporations whose primary purpose is political advocacy,
based on the individual member's rights of association.2 90 According
to Charles O'Kelley, corporations have associational rights only when
their members share a unity of views.291 Therefore, he concluded that
the Court correctly granted first amendment rights to political as-
sociations such as the NAACP.292 However, it is not so clear that all
members of political associations share similar views to any greater
degree than do shareholders of business corporations. If members of
political associations such as the ACLU do not enjoy an identity of
viewpoints, the apparent difference between a nonprofit advocacy
group and a for-profit business corporation remains the subjective de-
termination that a commercial purpose is less admirable than a polit-
ical one.293
Is it fair to conclude that corporate shareholders have no inherent
first amendment rights to associate because of the economic status of
the corporation? A corporation, whether nonprofit or for-profit, is a
vehicle for the expression of the common views of its members.29 4
Although stockholders of a modern, publicly traded corporation may
not view themselves as investing in order to amplify their beliefs, it is
reasonable to assume they nonetheless share the common goal of max-
imizing their investment. Corporate managers have a fiduciary duty
to serve the shareholders' interests by communicating on their behalf.
Pursuant to what has been called the "enlightened self interest"
school of thought regarding business's role in society, corporations
should anticipate the demands of society in order to actively shape
public policy issues, thereby furthering shareholder interests.295
289. See, e.g., O'Kelley, supra note 166, at 1363-66; Note, supra note 223, at 1857-58.
290. The Court has in the past granted political associations substantial first amend-
ment protection despite their incorporated status. See, e.g., In re Primus, 436 U.S.
412 (1978); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Flowers, 377 U.S. 288 (1964). And in Fed-
eral Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238 (1986),
the Court established an exception to the federal prohibition on corporations' ex-
pending general treasury funds for candidate campaign expenditures that applied
to nonprofit, issue-oriented corporations formed for political purposes. See supra
text accompanying notes 128-35.
291. O'Kelley, supra note 166, at 1363.
292. Id. at 1366.
293. Easley, supra note 30, at 707-10.
294. See generally R. Hm EN, IN DEFENsE OF THE CORPORATION, (1979)(corporations
are created and maintained through the exercise of individual rights, especially
freedom of association and freedom of contract).
295. Hatano, Should Corporations Exercise Their Freedom of Speech Rights?, 22 AM.
Bus. L.J. 165, 173-74 (1984).
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Under this theory, corporate political speech, through advocacy adver-
tising, lobbying, and political spending, is necessary to further share-
holders' economic interests and to respond to societal concerns.
It has been argued that treating business corporations differently
from nonprofit political associations for first amendment purposes
would not reduce the diversity of expression or hamper the speech of
those advocating a business point of view because corporate spokesper-
sons could form nonprofit political associations with their individual
funds.296 At least one such organization of business interests, the
Michigan Chamber of Commerce, was found by the Court to be insuf-
ficiently political to qualify as a nonprofit, ideological corporation in
the Austin case. Granted, the Michigan Chamber of Commerce ac-
cepted contributions from business corporations, and therefore was
not financed solely through the use of personal funds.
Still, the question must be raised whether a corporation's speech is
the same as, or can be replaced by, the speech of its individual manag-
ers, shareholders, and employees. Will management in its personal
capacity, for example, be ready and willing to fill the void left by a
prohibition on corporate expression? Certainly, instances can be
found where corporate interests and the individual concerns of man-
agement would conflict. For example, 1990 was characterized in the
popular press as the all-time worst year for the world's airlines, which
lost approximately $3.5 billion.297 Several carriers were forced into
bankruptcy, at least in part based on rising fuel costs caused by the
Middle East crisis.298 Although jet fuel costs increased by approxi-
mately thirty-three percent, 299 consumer oil prices went up much
more modestly. Faced with possible bankruptcy, airline corporations
might be expected to advocate a reallocation of costs so that consum-
ers would bear a proportionate share of the fuel price increase. If cor-
porations were prevented from expressing political opinions,
individual officers, directors, shareholders and employees of the air-
line would be faced with conflicting interests. These individuals, who
would be personal consumers of oil as well as employees of or inves-
tors in an airline, might be reluctant to spend their own funds to advo-
cate an increase in consumer prices that would also affect them
personally.
Any proposal to return to the artificial entity theory of the corpo-
ration requires an examination of just how accurate its assumptions
are. Does the business corporation really occupy a privileged position,
rife with state law advantages denied to other groups and organiza-
tions? As noted by Ronald Hessen, neither perpetual life nor limited
296. See, e.g., Note, supra note 223, at 1858.
297. McCarroll, Fighting for Their Lives, TIME, Feb. 25, 1991, at 65.
298. Id.
299. Id.
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liability are truly privileges bestowed on corporations by the state.
Rather, perpetual life means only that corporations need not renew
their charters, and limited liability is no more than an implied con-
tract between shareholders and corporate creditors.3 00
The artificial entity view of the corporation depicts American busi-
ness as dominated by a few giant corporations that are essentially free
from marketplace and government restraints. While this may have
been the case in the 1950s and even the 1960s, substantial changes in
American business have occurred since then. Unstable economic con-
ditions have killed the notion that big corporations automatically
make big profits; hostile takeovers threaten management that once
considered itself entrenched; deregulation and foreign competition
have introduced many corporations to price competition; and con-
sumer and public interest groups have challenged notions of corporate
legitimacy.3 01 American business is in the midst of what has been de-
scribed as an entrepreneurial revolution. An estimated 500,000 new,
small business corporations are currently being formed each year.3 02
These factors indicate that the large business corporation, while still a
major force in American society, is becoming less important rather
than more powerful.
Even assuming that business corporations enjoy a privileged posi-
tion in American society, they have paid dearly for their state law "ad-
vantages."3 03 According to Mayer, government regulation of business
has undergone four significant changes since 1960, the advent of what
he calls "modem regulation."04 First, although government regula-
tion pre-1960 sought primarily economic results, government regula-
tion after 1960 has aimed at social goals such as consumerism,
environmental protection, and health and safety.3 05 Second, modem
government regulation is implemented increasingly on the federal as
opposed to the state level.3 06 Third, modem regulation interferes in
what used to be private corporate matters and is more systematically
300. HESsEN, supra note 294, at 17-18.
301. Vogel, supra note 4, at 76-77.
302. Id.
303. "The claims for limiting corporate rights because of the special privileges granted
corporations by the states ... are substantially negated when it is remembered
that business corporations pay substantial amounts in corporate income taxes,
various special privileges taxes, and all the normal taxes, sales and property, as a
condition of this legal existence." Smith, Business, Buck$ and BulL The Corpora-
tion, the First Amendment & the Corrupt Practices Act, 4 DEL. J. CORP. L. 39, 112
(1978).
304. Mayer, supra note 11, at 601.
305. Id. at 601-03.
306. For example, Mayer noted that while prior to 1965, only one federal agency ex-
isted to safeguard consumers or employees from corporate operations, by 1977, 10
federal agencies existed for this purpose. Id. at 602.
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enforced than pre-1960 regulation. 07 Finally, modem regulation cov-
ers many different industries, making it less likely that any one indus-
try can overly influence or "capture" a particular government
agency.0s
Modern regulation is also expensive. One commentator estimated
the costs of federal regulation to business as $62.9 billion in 1976 and
$97.9 billion in 1979.309 Even after the deregulation of several indus-
tries during the Reagan Administration, regulatory costs to business
as a whole did not decrease.3 10 In some instances, state and local gov-
ernments increased their regulatory efforts in response to federal de-
regulation, resulting in costly compliance problems for those
companies doing business in more than one state.3 11 Irs fact, the price
of modern regulation continues to rise. For example, it has been esti-
mated that environmental regulation of industry ultimately resulted
in increased consumer costs of more than $70 billion in 1985, and per-
haps as much as $200 billion in 1990.312
This regulation is regarded by many business leaders as excessive,
nonproductive, and threatening to the competitive ability and produc-
tivity of American companies, especially as compared to relatively un-
regulated foreign competitors. 313 These leaders believe that their
interest in participating in the resolution of business regulation issues
is as legitimate as any special interest group. They argue that without
business input, resulting regulation is more likely to be ineffective and
counterproductive. 314 From the standpoint of fairness, it is hard to
deny corporations the right to communicate on political issues when
they have so much at stake. Moreover, that stake is shared by share-
holders and consumers.
A final problem with removing corporations from the coverage of
the first amendment has to do with whether the state can make corpo-
rations exchange their constitutional rights for any state law privi-
leges they may receive. According to the doctrine of unconstitutional
conditions, the government cannot remove first amendment protec-
tion for corporate political speech just because the state could refuse
to charter corporations at all. For example, in Frost & Frost Trucking
307. For example, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration Act of 1970 au-
thorizes regular inspections of corporate property. 5 U.S.C. § 7902 (1988).
308. Mayer, supra note 11, at 602-03.
309. Gray, supra note 79, at 439.
310. Rose-Ackerman, Deregulation and Reregulation: Rhetoric and Reality, 6 J.L. &
POL. 287, 301 (1990).
311. Id.
312. Hahn, Regulation: Past Presen and Future, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 167,
182 n.58 (citing M. HAZINA & R. Kopp, THE SOCIAL COST OF ENVIRONMENTAL
QUALITY REGULATIONS: A GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS 29 (1989)).
313. Gray, supra note 79, at 439-40.
314. Buchholz, supra note 3, at 65-66.
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Co. v. Railroad Commission,315 the Court invalidated a state statute
requiring incorporated private carriers to assume common-carrier lia-
bility in return for the use of the state highways. Such a condition, the
Court said, was coercive because the company had no choice but to
comply with the requirement.316 Similarly, the choice between being
granted the right to do business with limited liability pursuant to the
corporate form versus the right to political expression is no choice at
all. Neither provides a satisfactory result. Corporations cannot exist
unless they are incorporated and their ability to accumulate capital
may depend on corporate structure. Similarly, their success in the
marketplace may depend on their ability to communicate.
However, as noted by Kathleen Sullivan, Supreme Court prece-
dent regarding unconstitutional conditions is far from consistent.3 17 If
the Court characterized a prohibition on corporate expression as a
penalty, the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions should invalidate
the condition. On the other hand, if the Court opted to treat the con-
dition as a mere offer to business persons to choose between different
varieties of business organization, the condition could be upheld.
In summary, any solution to the problem of corporate dominance
in ballot issue campaigns that completely denies first amendment
rights to corporations cuts too broadly to be either constitutional or
justifiable. First, such a solution erroneously assumes that corporate
speech, including commercial speech, adds nothing to the marketplace
of ideas, either because it lacks intrinsic merit or because it sees the
corporation as indistinguishable from its individual members. Second,
a prohibition on corporate speech would require a constitutional defi-
nition of the press, which, if narrow enough to exclude corporate
speakers, could raise serious application problems. Furthermore, a to-
tal repudiation of corporate speech rights would infringe on the ability
of shareholders to associate to further their economic interests and
would contradict current theories of corporate social responsibility.
Corporations are not necessarily as large and as powerful as they once
were in American life, and they are subject to increasingly intrusive
and comprehensive government regulation. With so much at stake, it
could be argued that forcing corporations to choose between incorpo-
ration and the right to communicate is coercive and constitutes an un-
constitutional condition.
2. Deny political speech rights to business corporations.
According to Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Bellotti, corporations
should have first amendment rights only to the extent necessary to
315. 271 U.S. 583 (1926).
316. Id. at 593.
317. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1415, 1416 (1989).
1991]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
protect their business and property interests pursuant to the property
clause of the fourteenth amendment.31 8 Therefore, media corpora-
tions have first amendment rights, including the right of political ad-
vocacy, because they are in the business of speaking. And under this
approach, business corporations that sell a product or service would be
allowed to engage in commercial advertising.
Several commentators have endorsed this view in one form or an-
other, and have called for a restriction of corporate political speech
rights for business corporations. For example, David Ratner has sug-
gested that a corporation be allowed to speak only on matters that
directly further its corporate purpose.3 19 This would mean that media
corporations could speak to publish and broadcast the news, ideologi-
cal corporations such as the ACLU could speak to promote political
beliefs and ideas, and business corporations could engage in commer-
cial speech in order to turn a profit.
Again, this proposal would seem to solve the problem of undue cor-
porate influence in ballot issue campaigns; however, it raises counter-
vailing issues. First, it assumes that corporate political speech is
valueless and ignores the first amendment rights of listeners to re-
ceive information from corporate sources. Second, it would require a
constitutional definition of the press as described previously to deter-
mine which corporations are in the business of disseminating speech.
Furthermore, it presupposes that corporate political activity does not
serve any legitimate business purpose. Yet American business leaders
have increasingly adopted a proactive approach to shaping public pol-
icy issues, rather than merely responding after the fact to expensive
government regulation and legislation. Political speech, including lob-
bying, issue advertising, and political spending both through direct ex-
penditures and corporate PACs, can have a major effect on a
corporation's bottom line. For example, in 1980, the Standard Oil
Company spent almost $1 million to defeat a ballot measure that
would have increased its taxes by as much as $75 million per year.320
318. See supra text accompanying notes 71-72.
319. Ratner, Corporations and the Constitution, 15 U.S.F. L. REV. 11, 29 (1980-81).
Another variation on this theme was proposed by Jill Fisch, who suggested
that state incorporation laws be used to set limits on corporate political speech.
Despite Fisch's belief that corporate political speech enriches the marketplace of
ideas, she would allow a state to eliminate such speech as long as it did so pursu-
ant to its incorporation statutes. Fisch, Frankenstein's Monster Hits the Cam-
paign Traik An Approach to Regulation of Corporate Political Expenditures, 32
WM. & MARY L. REV. 587, 642 (1991). But whether a state limits corporate polit-
ical speech via the mechanism of its campaign finance laws or its incorporation
statutes remains ultimately immaterial to the considerations discussed herein.
320. Shockley, supra note 242, at 380 n.9. Shockley also cites the example of the to-
bacco industry, which spent more than $6 million in 1978 to defeat a California
proposition prohibiting smoking in public places. Id. at 380 n.8. He explained that
"[i]f each American smoker smoked only one less cigarette a day, the tobacco
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This outlay could certainly be characterized as a reasonable attempt to
protect its property, profits, and the interests of its shareholders.
Additionally, this approach results in the anomaly of providing
greater first amendment rights for commercial than for political
speech. Historically, the Supreme Court has seen political speech,
which enriches the marketplace of ideas, as more deserving of consti-
tutional protection than commercial speech, which merely proposes a
commercial transaction. 21 This approach would require a major re-
versal of Supreme Court precedent and first amendment theory to
place commercial speech above political speech on the hierarchy of
protected expression.
In a variation on this solution, Richard Alderman has proposed
that all speech by commercial entities, including business corporations
and partnerships, be treated as commercial speech for first amend-
ment purposes. 32 2 Alderman would exclude corporations engaged in
the communications or entertainment business, and civic, religious, or
charitable organizations from the definition of commercial entity, but
would include individual entrepreneurs, partners, and corporate man-
agers when they are speaking in their official capacity. He would even
consider the speech of media corporations (but apparently not ideolog-
ical corporations) as commercial if the speech had an economic mo-
tive.3 23 Government regulation of economically motivated speech
would, under this solution, be subject to the less strict standard of re-
view established for commercial speech in Central Hudson. Obvi-
ously, this would remove the problem of treating political speech as
inferior to commercial speech by redefining all corporate speech as
commercial.324
industry would lose an estimated $450 million a year... In view of this projected
loss, spending over six million dollars to stop California, which contains more
than one-tenth of the American populace, from adopting an ordinance restricting
smoking was economically reasonable." Id. at 380 n.9.
321. A comparison of Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447
U.S. 557 (1980), a commercial speech case, and Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public
Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530 (1980), a political speech case decided on the same
day, illustrates the difference in analysis. In Central Hudson, the Court in its
three-part test said that truthful advertising concerning a lawful activity could be
restricted if the regulation advanced a substantial state interest without limiting
speech more than necessary to achieve the interest. See supra text accompanying
notes 33-36. However, in Consolidated Edison, the Court subjected a regulation of
political speech to more exacting scrutiny. The state prohibition on noncommer-
cial speech could be upheld only as a permissible time, place, manner or subject-
matter regulation, or as a "narrowly tailored means of serving a compelling state
interest." Id. at 535. See supra text accompanying notes 80-81.
322. Alderman, Commercial Entities' Noncommercial Speech: A Contradiction in
Terms, 1982 UTAH L. REv. 731, 732 (1982).
323. Id. at 744-46.
324. This solution would require the Court to overrule Consolidated Edison Co. v.
Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530 (1980), where it suggested that economic moti-
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Alderman's proposal relies on the assumption that commercial
speech is accorded a "substantial measure" of first amendment protec-
tion.325 This in turn assumes that commercial speech will continue to
be afforded such protection. However, since the Supreme Court's 1986
decision in Posadas de Puerto Rico Assoc. v. Tourism Co.,326 the state
may find it significantly easier to justify restrictions on commercial
speech. In that case, the Court upheld Puerto Rico's restriction on
nondeceptive advertising of legal casino gambling to native residents.
Although in the five-four ruling the majority purported to apply the
Central Hudson three-part test, it in fact adopted Justice Rehnquist's
Central Hudson dissent. Writing for the majority, Rehnquist deter-
mined that Puerto Rico had a substantial interest in discouraging ca-
sino gambling among its citizens. Therefore, he concluded that the
Puerto Rico legislature could reasonably have believed that the adver-
tising prohibition directly advanced this interest and could reasonably
have decided that no less intrusive means would have effected this
goal.327 Instead of requiring Puerto Rico to prove that the advertising
ban directly advanced a legitimate state interest that could not have
been achieved by any other means, the Court turned the Central Hud-
son test into a meaningless presumption of legislative reasonableness.
Commentators have noted that the Court's approach in Posadas
may never be extended beyond cases involving the promotion of prod-
ucts or services that, like gambling, have traditionally been heavily
regulated.3 28 But should the Supreme Court rethink the commercial
speech doctrine, does it make sense for the constitutional protection of
all speech of economic entities to be modified accordingly? It seems
inappropriate to tie all economically-motivated speech to the level of
first amendment protection accorded commercial speech without con-
sidering the result if the Supreme Court changes the rules for com-
mercial speech.
By characterizing all economically-motivated speech as commer-
cial speech, this proposal could entirely remove corporations and their
spokespersons from the political process. Under Alderman's plan, lob-
byists and other individuals representing corporations could be pro-
hibited from speaking, because their speech, too, would be regarded as
commercial. In our modern society, could any speech be determined
vation did not make corporate speech commercial speech. See supra text accom-
panying notes 80-81.
325. Alderman, supra note 322, at 731.
326. 478 U.S. 328 (1986).
327. Id. at 341-44.
328. See, e.g., MASS COMMUNICATIONS, supra note 288, at 524-25. For critical reviews of
Posadas, see Kurland, Posadas de Puerto Rico v. Tourism Company: "'Twas
Strange, 'Twas Passing Strange, 'Twas Pitiful 'Twas Wonderous Pitiful," 1986
SUP. CT. REV. 1; Note, Trends in First Amendment Protection of Commercial
Speech, 41 VAND. L. REV. 173, 204 (1988)(authored by Mary B. Nutt).
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to be purely political under Alderman's analysis? Would a city council
candidate's speech be considered political if it were given at a fundrais-
ing dinner? Would a candidate's motivation to run for elective office
be an economic one if the position paid a salary? Or would the adver-
tisement at issue in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,3 29 considered by
the Court to be political speech, be commercial and therefore not enti-
tled to the constitutional defense established in that case? This solu-
tion could seriously lessen diversity of expression by lowering the
standard of constitutional protection not only for speech by business
corporations, but for all economically-motivated speech.
3. Provide public financing for ballot issue questions.
Some commentators have suggested that to eliminate the disparate
spending problem, public monies should be allocated to the un-
derfunded side in grossly disparate ballot campaigns.330
This alternative assumes, of course, that recipients of public financ-
ing possess the political know-how to wage effective campaigns so that
public expenditures ultimately make a difference in campaign out-
comes. More importantly, it also raises many logistical concerns. As-
suming that the public would support and pay for a system of public
financing, someone would have to determine not only which issues
should receive public funds, but also which groups or individuals. Bal-
lot questions may involve an unlimited number of viewpoints, rather
than just two sides. And even if only one "pro" and one "con" position
exist, each side may have many different factions and supporters. Re-
alistically, the state could not provide funding for each and every issue
on the ballot.331
Public financing would be a costly solution to the problem of dis-
329. 376 U.S. 254 (1964)(editorial advertisement granted first amendment protection).
330. See, e.g., Lowenstein, supra note 259, at 578-83. In Buckley, the Court upheld the
constitutionality of public financing of presidential election campaigns, stating
that it enhanced public discussion. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 95-96 (1976)(out-
lining plan for fund to administer matching funds in California ballot measures.
See infra note 331).
331. Lowenstein has suggested that once any side of a ballot measure had received an
established threshold amount in contributions (he uses $50,000), it thereafter be
required to report further contributions daily to a state agency. At such time as
any side reported a total in excess of a specified amount (say, of $1 million or
more), the agency would then provide to the other side one dollar for every addi-
tional dollar reported, offset by the amount by which the total for the second side
also exceeded $1 million. Lowenstein, supra note 259, at 579.
Advantages of this plan include that public financing would only be provided
for campaigns involving substantial spending, and disparities between sides
would be limited to no more than $1 million. The high spending side would not
lose incentive to raise money because each dollar it collected would continue to be
used for its campaign activities, and high spenders would still be in a position to
determine the scope of the campaign. Id. at 580.
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proportionate corporate political spending. Reported expenditures on
the twelve California ballot proposals considered in 1982 totalled more
than $36 million.332 At least six of those ballot propositions involved
spending by one or both sides of over $1 million.333 Using a system of
public financing suggested by Lowenstein 334 and based on Zisk's
figures,3 35 public financing would have cost the state of California at
least $14,149,300 in 1982. This sum would have included $783,000 to
support a reapportionment proposition whose supporters reported no
expenditures, and $2,483,600 to oppose a nuclear freeze proposal
where that opposition reported expenditures of only six thousand
dollars.336
These figures lead to two conclusions. First, it should be asked
whether large sums of public money should subsidize campaigns that
appear to have little public backing. In these instances, does public
firancing really serve to reflect actual public support for political posi-
tions? Second, and more critically, will state legislators and taxpayers
be willing to devote tax dollars for this purpose, especially at a time
when state revenues are declining? Even under Lowenstein's plan,
public financing will be administratively complex at the state level
and even harder to implement at the local level. Considering these
obstacles, public financing appears to be too complex and costly to be a
workable solution.
4. Expand the fairness doctrine.
It has also been suggested that the fairness doctrine337 be enforced
and expanded to provide free broadcast media time to financial under-
dogs in ballot issue elections or at least to require that broadcasters
present both sides of ballot issues in news and public affairs program-
ming.338 In order to prevent imbalances in coverage of ballot ques-
tions, this proposal would hold broadcasters to the same standards in
referendum campaigns as in candidate elections. Under these require-
ments, for example, broadcasters that air editorials regarding ballot
issues would be obliged to provide a reasonable opportunity for re-
sponse from those with differing views; broadcasters would have to
332. MAGLEBY, supra note 13, at 149 and app. E.
333. ZisK, supra note 15, at 198-99.
334. See supra note 327.
335. Zisk, supra note 15, at 198-99. Her figures include expenditures only for major
ballot issues.
336. 1& at 198. These figures assume that the underfunded side of a ballot issue need
not raise a threshold amount to be eligible for public funding.
337. The doctrine provided that broadcasters must provide a reasonable amount of air
time for the discussion of public concerns and must also provide balanced cover-
age of all reasonable viewpoints on those matters addressed. See Fairness Report,
48 F.C.C.2d 1 (1974).
338. See, e.g., Mastro, Costlow & Sanchez, supra note 29, at 333-36.
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keep detailed records documenting their replies to requests for broad-
cast time; and broadcasters' compliance with the doctrine would be
evaluated by the FCC under the "equal opportunities rule" rather
than the "reasonableness" standard.339
Ifi its favor, this solution recognizes the value of corporate expres-
sion to the voting public. It addresses the problem of disproportionate
spending in initiative/referendum contests by mandating more, rather
than less, speech. And by applying strictly to ballot propositions, it
does not cut too broadly and infringe on unrelated free speech rights.
However, this proposal seems unlikely to solve the undue influence
problem for at least three reasons.
First, the fairness doctrine currently is not being enforced and its
political future is uncertain.3 40 The doctrine itself raises questions
about the propriety of government intervention in the editorial deci-
sions of broadcasters. 34 1 Second, it assumes that recipients of free air
time have the financial wherewithal to use it effectively. Waging a
convincing media campaign involves not only the expense of acquiring
air time, but also the costs of conducting voter attitude studies, hiring
media consultants, procuring equipment and expertise, and designing
appealing advertisements.342 Free broadcast time, although a start, is
not enough by itself to rectify disproportionate spending. Obviously,
the doctrine does not apply to the print media. And before the doc-
trine was shelved by the FCC, some high-spenders in ballot campaigns
had learned to refrain from using their funds in ways that would re-
sult in free air time for their opposition.343
Finally, it has been suggested that expanding the fairness doctrine
will work only if increased media advertising does away with decep-
tion in ballot issue elections.344 In her study of two-sided high spend-
ing ballot question campaigns, Zisk found that both sides tended to
oversimplify issues and relied on slogans and misleading advertising.
She concluded that increased media access pursuant to a resurrected
and enlarged fairness doctrine is likely to result in more distortion and
no more information.34 5 Further research should be conducted re-
339. Id. at 339-41.
340. In 1987, the FCC announced it would no longer enforce the fairness doctrine ex-
cept for certain rules regarding political editorializing and replies to personal at-
tacks. In re Complaint of Syracuse Peace Council, 2 FCC Rcd. 5043 (1987). Two
years later, a federal court upheld the FCC's repeal of the doctrine, ruling that
the agency's action was not arbitrary or capricious. Syracuse Peace Council v.
FCC, 867 F.2d. 654 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
341. Easley, supra note 30, at 732.
342. See generally Pierce, The Big Ohio Utility Referendum Win: Defeat of an Ini-
tially Popular Initiative, CAMPAIGNs AND ELECTrIoNs, Spring 1983, 40-45.
343. LYDENBERG, supra note 15, at 53-54.
344. See ZIsK, supra note 15, at 264.
345. Id. at 136.
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garding two-sided high spending and fraudulent campaigning in the
initiative/referendum context.
One possible remedy to this problem of deceptive advertising is for
state and local governments to enact legislation creating a cause of ac-
tion for false advertising in initiative and referendum contests. Ore-
gon has tried such an approach, providing compensatory damages and
attorney fee awards for intentional falsehoods in ballot proposition ad-
vertising.346 Because of conflicting first amendment rights, however,
courts could be hesitant to find campaigners guilty of false advertising.
Furthermore, much "deceptive" campaign advertising might be char-
acterized as unverifiable opinion rather than absolute statements of
fact.3 47 Though they might prevail under such a statute, underfunded
plaintiffs would probably only be able to recover post election
publicity.
5. Require shareholder consent to corporate political spending.
Victor Brudney has proposed that state legislation be enacted
prohibiting business corporations from engaging in political activity
without unanimous shareholder consent.348 According to this view,
any action of the corporation that does not specifically advance its cor-
porate purpose is ultra vires and therefore cannot lawfully be made
without the consent of all the shareholders. 349 Although in theory,
this solution would not prevent corporate domination of ballot issue
campaigns, in practice its likely effect would be to prohibit corporate
political speech altogether. However, it would serve the shareholders'
interest in exercising control over, and staying informed of, corporate
political activities.
Like the proposals discussed above that would allow corporate
commercial speech but not political speech, this recommendation as-
sumes that corporate political speech does not advance a proper busi-
ness purpose. Yet, clearly, political spending (including lobbying) can
have a very definite impact on the corporation's bottom line. By al-
lowing corporations to engage in commercial speech without share-
holder consent, this solution also places commercial speech above
political speech in terms of first amendment protection.
Furthermore, Brudney would exempt nonprofit, political advocacy
groups from such a requirement because their purpose contemplates
political advocacy.350 Brudney's rationale behind this proposal is the
protection of minority shareholders; however, his exclusion of polit-
ical advocacy groups does not follow. Certainly, all members of polit-
346. OR& REV. STAT. § 260.532 (1989); see LYDENBERG, supra note 15, at 29-30.
347. Shockley, supra note 242, at 424.
348. Brudney, supra note 221, at 294-95.
349. Id. at 244-45.
350. See Id. at 294.
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ical advocacy groups such as the ACLU do not agree on the issues (and
the subtleties of those issues) supported by that group.
As far as protecting shareholders, corporate management makes
many decisions with which shareholders may disagree. Why not pro-
tect shareholders against management's business decisions, which are
likely to have much greater personal consequences to shareholders
than political advocacy questions? For that matter, some shareholders
may find certain corporate advertising campaigns distasteful. What
justifies a greater level of shareholder protection when political
speech, rather than commercial speech, is involved? It follows from
the very nature of the corporate form that by investing in a corpora-
tion, shareholders consent to the procedures of corporate governance.
They entrust all ordinary corporate matters, including political speech
questions, to management in hopes of maximizing their investment.
As discussed above, a better solution might be for the SEC to re-
quire all corporations to disclose their political expenditures in their
annual reports or proxy statements. Shareholders are usually kept in
the dark about their corporation's political spending.51 By informing
shareholders of corporate political activities even after the fact, share-
holders would be able to exercise their existing rights under corporate
procedures if they felt strongly enough. Such disclosure would also
provide a record for examination by potential shareholders when
making investment decisions. In these ways, corporate disclosure of
political spending would further shareholder rights by requiring more
speech, rather than by curtailing it.
6. Enact financial disclosure laws.
Another proposed solution to the disproportionate spending prob-
lem calls for states to enact laws requiring public disclosure of ballot
issue campaign finances, including a list of those who contribute more
than a specified minimum amount.352 The rationale behind these laws
is that the public is better able to evaluate campaign rhetoric if it
knows whose money is financing the message. If, for example, the
public learns that business interests have engaged in massive spending
to defeat a proposed ballot issue, voters may be more likely to look
beyond the advertising slogans to evaluate the real issues and interests
involved. Certainly, disclosure would not prohibit dominance of ballot
issue campaigns by big spenders. But when grossly disparate levels of
spending are publicized, voter antipathy could result in a backlash
against high spenders, defeating their attempts to drown out the other
side.353 Statutory disclosure requirements have the advantage of fea-
351. See supra text accompanying note 237.
352. See, e.g., ZISK supra note 15, at 263.
353. CRONIN, supra note 15, at 116; Allen supra note 276, at 1036.
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sibility, as well as their minimal impact on first amendment rights.
However, most states that allow ballot measures already have dis-
closure laws.3 m Because many current laws do not require reporting
until just before or after the election, the effectiveness of disclosure
statutes has been questioned. In effect, the disclosure of much heavy
spending comes too late to be meaningful. And because disclosure
statements are filed with government officials such as the secretary of
state, voters may never learn the source of campaign funds. More im-
portantly, researchers have found little evidence that knowing the
identity of campaign contributors has any effect on voters.355
One way to ensure timeliness, and thereby increase the probable
effect of such information on voters, would be to require principal do-
nors to be disclosed in all political advertising.356 For example, disclo-
sure statutes could demand that the top three contributors be
identified in all advertisements sponsored by political committees.
This would alleviate the problem noted by the Supreme Court in
Berkeley that political committees often hide their true identity by us-
ing "seductive names."3 57
7 Require government-produced voter information pamphlets.
To provide voters with meaningful data about ballot propositions,
some states358 and cities 359 mail voter's information pamphlets or
handbooks to each registered voter before ballot proposition elections.
These handbooks provide the text and a summary of each proposal,
plus arguments for and against the ballot propositions. Although in-
formation guidebooks will not prevent disproportionate campaign
spending, they ensure that voters at least have the opportunity to
learn about both sides of ballot issues. Furthermore, they guarantee
minimal exposure to the underfinanced side of ballot propositions
without limiting first amendment rights of high spenders.
Voter information pamphlets will not achieve their purpose, how-
ever, if voters either do not read or do not understand them. Existing
data indicates that most people do not read voter information materi-
als, and that approximately two-thirds of the recipients cannot under-
354. Disclosure requirements have been enacted in 22 states; most recently in 1989,
Arkansas passed a ballot question disclosure statute. See ZISK, supra note 15, at
262; DiPippa, The Constitutionality of the Arkansas Ballot Question Disclosure
Act, 12 U. ARK. LrITLE ROCK L.J. 481 (1989-90).
355. ZISK, supra note 15, at 262-63. David Magleby reported that most of the Califor-
nia voters he studied did not consider information on campaign spending when
deciding how to vote. MAGLEBY, supra note 13, at 150.
356. Shockley, supra note 242, at 417-18.
357. 454 U.S. 290, 298 (1981).
358. Arizona, California, Massachusetts, Montana, North Dakota, Oregon, Rhode Is-
land, and Washington.
359. For example, Los Angeles.
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stand them.360 Using several readability assessment formulas, one
researcher found that voter's handbooks in four states were written at
or above the reading level of a third-year college student.61
Furthermore, voter pamphlets are expensive. Costs of voter infor-
mation handbooks have been estimated at more than $350,000 per
election in Massachusetts to more than $2 million per election in Cali-
fornia.3 62 Allocating state funding for voter information materials is
equivalent to throwing money away unless the end product is both
comprehensible and informative.
8. Enact contribution and expenditure limits.
While contribution limits in ballot issue elections have been pro-
posed,3 63 contribution limits alone cannot prevent unlimited expendi-
tures and therefore would not solve the undue influence problem.
Ceilings placed on contributions can be easily avoided through direct
expenditures and through the making of many small gifts through
family members and business arrangements.
Expenditure limits, of course, were declared unconstitutional in
Buckley and Bellotti. However, as discussed above, the Supreme
Court has redefined "corruption" to include the disproportionate im-
pact of wealth on the electoral process and has upheld an expenditure
limit in the candidate election context in Austin. Furthermore, suffi-
cient evidence currently exists to justify expenditure limits in ballot
elections, even under strict judicial scrutiny.3 "
Whether contribution limits coupled with expenditure limits
360. MAGLEBY, supra note 13, at 138. Julian Eule described his experience with a Cali-
fornia ballot pamphlet as follows:
Its contents included a staggering array of bond acts, proposed constitu-
tional amendments and statutory initiatives. The pamphlet contained
the complete text of each ballot measure (some running over a dozen
pages in print so small that a magnifying glass, if not a microscope, was
required to read it), summaries prepared by the State's Attorney Gen-
eral, analyses by someone identified as the Legislative Analyst, argu-
ments in favor of and in opposition to each measure written by a diverse
group of persons chosen by some unexplained process, and rebuttals to
both sets of arguments, often by yet a different group of mysteriously-
selected 'representative' voices. Even those able to make the major time
commitment necessary to trudge through the opus-the 1988 version ran
159 pages-must have found the going tough. The propositions average
over forty-five words per sentence ....
Eule, supra note 16, at 1508-09.
361. MAGLEBY, supra note 13, at 138-39. The states included- California, Massachu-
setts, Oregon, and Rhode Island. I&i
362. MAGLEBY, supra note 13, at 138. One cheaper solution, used in Michigan, is for
the state to publish the text of ballot questions in regional newspapers. ZIsK,
supra note 15, at 63.
363. Lowenstein, supra note 259, at 602.
364. See supra text accompanying notes 244-76.
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would serve the conflicting first amendment values presented by the
problem of disproportionate spending in ballot proposition campaigns
depends on the nature of the spending restrictions. Contribution and
expenditure limits that applied solely to business corporations would
look suspiciously like a government attempt to equalize speech, which
would raise troublesome first amendment questions as well as practi-
cal problems. Can either the Court or elected representatives restrict
speech in order to balance the amount of speech presented with the
degree of actual public support for a position? Even if such a scale
could be devised, is the calibration of speech a proper job for the gov-
ernment? Justice Scalia questioned in his Austin dissent whether the
government could be trusted to do this job.365 The notion that it is not
the government's role to determine whose speech is allowed and
whose speech is prohibited seems central to the meaning of the first
amendment.3 66
Furthermore, in attempting to equalize speech the government
would have to devise a method of quantifying "public support." If
corporations are powerful, that power may indicate an increased,
rather than a lesser, level of support for corporate speech. Certainly,
corporations are a major force in our economy and a preferred form of
doing business. They employ millions of Americans and touch the
lives of many more. Corporations are a pervasive presence in our soci-
ety; perhaps "equality" would require that corporate speech should be
given an extra measure of first amendment protection.
If equalization of speech is accepted as a permissible state interest,
it seems illogical to apply contribution and expenditure limits only to
corporate speakers. In a democracy, articulate speakers will always
have an advantage over the inarticulate, and wealthy individuals and
groups will be able to speak more effectively than those with fewer
resources. Absolute equality of speech would be impossible to achieve,
not to mention of dubious value. Carried to its logical extreme, equali-
zation of speech would result in reduction of speech to the lowest com-
mon denominator.
Rather than attempting to equalize speech by restricting corporate
spending so as to enhance the relative voices of others, a better ap-
proach would be to limit the spending of all participants in the ballot
issue process. If, as the evidence presented in this Article shows, high
and disproportionate spending creates an undue influence problem in
ballot elections, then the state can justify contribution and expendi-
ture restrictions as necessary to protect the electoral process. If the
365. Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 110 S. Ct. at 1391, 1415 (1990).
366. "The state lacks 'moderators' who can be trusted to know when 'everything
worth saying' has been said, and the legislature lacks the capacity to write laws
that will tell a moderator when to make such a ruling." Karst, Equality as a
Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 20, 40 (1975).
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rationale for limiting corporate political speech is to prevent financial
dominance in the political process, then such regulation should apply
to other wealthy groups and individuals as well.
Certainly, the idea of imposing spending limits in referendum and
initiative campaigns is not a new one. Judge J. Skelly Wright, for ex-
ample, called for "the imposition of spending limits at a level high
enough to assure adequate debate but low enough to permit all views
to find clear, unstifled expression."36 7
Recent research findings have shown that two-sided high spending
made the problem of deceptive and confusing campaign tactics in bal-
lot campaigns worse instead of better.368 If so, then neither giving
money to the underfunded side, nor restricting the amount by which
one side can outspend the other, will adequately protect the political
process. Instead, a relatively simple statute placing contribution and
expenditure limits on all speakers in ballot elections might be not only
the simplest but also the most effective means of achieving Judge
Wright's objectives. While such a solution clearly infringes on first
amendment rights, the infringement could be justified as necessary to
protect the political process from the dominating impact of high
spending in ballot measure campaigns.
In a ballot issue campaign, an individual or group may spend
money directly in order to defeat or approve a ballot proposition.
Likewise, an individual or group may contribute money to a political
association for it to spend in support or against a ballot proposition.
As mentioned above, it makes no sense to limit one form of political
spending and not the other. However, contribution limits restrict not
only speech, but associational rights as well. The Supreme Court
noted in Berkeley that contribution limits must not deny speakers the
ability to form groups for the purpose of amplifying their voices. Any
contribution and expenditure limits, therefore, should not disallow in-
dividuals and groups from combining their individual contributions.
These groups, whether preexisting political organizations, ad hoc
groups of citizens, or business corporations, would not be allowed to
spend more than the sum of their accumulated and ear-marked indi-
vidual contributions.
In order for across-the-board contribution and expenditure restric-
tions to be constitutional, they must be high enough to ensure clear
367. Wright, supra note 5, at 644. Another proposal involves basing a spending limit
for the richer side of a ballot proposition on the projected spending level of the
poorer side. This "spending differential limit," which would be different for
every high-spender in every ballot contest, would not limit overall spending, but
rather just establish an allowable ratio of spending. Easley, supra note 30, at 749-
53. It is based on the assumption, however, that disproportionate spending,
rather than high-spending in general, has caused the undue influence problem in
ballot elections.
368. See supra notes 271-72 and accompanying text.
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and effective communication of views. In Buckley, the Court invali-
dated a $1000 expenditure ceiling in federal candidate elections, saying
that the limit was so low that it would exclude citizens and groups
"from any significant use of the most effective modes of communica-
tion."369 The Court noted that as of January 1975, a full-page adver-
tisement in a major metropolitan daily newspaper cost almost $7000,
and that not even a quarter of a page could be had for $1000.370 There-
fore, any contribution or expenditure limit must be high enough to
ensure that speakers can purchase at least some access to media
channels.
With these considerations in mind, local ordinances and/or state
statutes could be drafted that would be both constitutional and also
useful to prevent excessive spending in ballot issue campaigns. Spend-
ing limits should be keyed to the costs of media access and therefore
would vary in different markets. For example, a legislature could de-
termine that a $5000 contribution and a $5000 expenditure limit for all
individuals, corporations, unions, and other associations in any local
ballot issue campaign would be fair in a particular state. For statewide
campaigns, the limits could be increased to $10,000. All persons or
groups that made contributions or expenditures above a threshold
limit of, say, $500 would be required to file a statement with local or
state officials. These illustrative spending limits would be high
enough to allow some access to the media for all concerned, yet pre-
vent monied interests from spending millions of dollars in ballot issue
campaigns.
The best solution to the problem of high-spending in the initiative
and referendum context would not rely solely on spending ceilings.
Stricter disclosure laws, including a requirement that major contribu-
tors be disclosed in all committee advertising, would make disclosure a
more meaningful concept. An SEC regulation mandating that corpo-
rations reveal their political spending to existing and potential share-
holders would help protect the rights of shareholders who may
disagree with the corporate expenditures. State laws prohibiting de-
ceptive advertising in ballot issue elections could improve the quality
of campaigning. But without spending limits, it is doubtful that these
measures can save the ballot issue campaign process from the dangers
of high and disproportionate spending.
IX. CONCLUSION
In a series of cases culminating with the Austin decision, the
Supreme Court has laid the foundation to overturn Bellot and allow
prohibitions on corporate spending in ballot issue campaigns. How-
369. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1976).
370. Id. at n.20.
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ever, rather than prohibit corporate spending alone, a better approach
would be to treat all speakers equally. The Court should let Bellotti
stand on the grounds that the Massachusetts statute impermissibly
discriminated against one class of organizational speakers-business
corporations. For expenditure and contribution limits to pass consti-
tutional muster, they should apply to special interest groups, labor un-
ions, trade associations, ad hoc groups of citizens and business
corporations alike. However, because business corporations are the
most frequent big spenders in ballot issue campaigns, such limits
would have a greater impact on business corporations-as they should.
Furthermore, spending limits should also apply to expenditures and
contributions by individuals in order to prevent evasion of the organi-
zational limits and to recognize that organizations have no corner on
the market for immense wealth. The integrity of the marketplace of
ideas will be better protected by limiting the speech of all interests,
than by prohibiting the speech of one.
